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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, companies have used stock option plans to attract and
keep quality employees and to align employees' interests with those of
shareholders.' Stock options give company employees2 the right to buy
a certain number of shares of stock from the company at a predetermined
exercise price for a limited period of time.3 The exercise price is usually
at or above the market price of the company's stock at the time the
option is issued.4
Stock options theoretically provide employees with incentives to work
hard5 in the hopes that their efforts will ultimately result in a higher
market price for the company's stock.6 If the market price does rise,
then the employees will usually exercise their stock options and
purchase the stock from the company at the exercise price. Absent
1. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 557-62 (1984) (stating that increased
stock ownership by management ensures common interest with shareholders in
company's growth). See also Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the
1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 123, 141-42 (2000) (documenting and discussing the phenomenon of option
repricing in the last decade).
2. In most cases, employees are not required to pay for the stock options
themselves. Instead, at the time the option is exercised, the employee buys stock from
the company at the predetermined exercise price. See JoHN DOwNEs & JORDAN ELLIOT
GOODMAN, BARRON's FINANCE & INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 300 (4th ed. 1995)
[hereinafter BARRON's]. But see Haft v. Dart Group Corp., No. CIV.A.13736, 1994 WL
643185, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1994) (describing an incoming president who paid
company for options at time of issuance).
3. See BARRON'S, supra note 2, at 611. The exercise price is also sometimes
referred to as the strike price. See id. at 300, 614.
4. See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMPLOYMENT L. 227, 235 n.28 (1999) ("While options need not be granted with an
exercise price equal to fair market value at the date of grant, doing so is common and
reasonable.").
5. See generally Stabile, supra note 4. While it is unclear whether equity-based
compensation causes positive performance, there appears to be a positive linear
correlation between a company's performance and the equity-based portion of its CEO's
compensation. See Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and
Firm Performance, 38 J. FiN. EcON. 163, 164, 169, 176-78 (1995).
6. See generally Statutory Stock Options, NCEO Library (visited Sept. 29, 2000)
<http:llwww.nceo.org/library/equityl.html> (stating that "[s]tock options are the most
popular form of long-term compensation incentives for [U.S.] executives," but that they
need to be properly structured to accomplish their intended results) [hereinafter Statutory
Stock Options].
7. Some commentators have stated that equity interests such as stock option
repricing provide "incentives to key employees by giving them a stake in the business,
preserve[] capital by enabling companies, such as start-ups, to pay lower cash
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restrictions imposed by the securities laws,8 employees are free to sell
their stock in the open market at the current price and capture what is
hopefully a significant profit.9 For example, a company issues stock
options that give employees the option to purchase one share of stock at
an exercise price of $10.00 per share. The exercise price is a higher
price than the current market price of the company's stock. One year
later, however, the company's stock rises to $15.00 per share. An
employee may then decide to exercise his option and purchase stock
from the company at $10.00 per share. The employee will then
immediately turn around and sell it in the open market for $15.00 per
share. Hence, the employee makes a $5.00 profit per share.
When employees profit from the exercise of their options,'0 the
employees receive a nice fringe benefit. However, the company has also
gained; the company enjoys a higher stock price' and has compensated
its employee without a cash outlay.'2 Additionally, upon the exercise of
compensation; and permit[] smaller companies to compete for talent with larger
companies with greater resources by holding out the prospect of significant appreciation
in value." Stanley Keller, Overview of Employee Equity Compensation, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: TAX, BusiNEss, AND SUCCESSION PLANNING FOR THE GROWING
COMPANY, Mar. 6, 1997, at 281, 283, available in Westlaw, SB71 ALI-ABA 281.
8. This would include such things as the prohibition against buying or selling
stock based upon material inside information. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d
1051, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that insider trading liability arises where insider
makes actual use of material non-public information in consummating securities
transaction).
9. For example, an employee is granted an option to buy one share of the
company's stock at $10.00, which is the price at which the company's stock is publicly
trading at the time of the grant of the option. The terms of the stock option plan provide
that she may exercise this option at any time over the next five years, but she will
probably not exercise the option immediately because it would not be profitable. She
would simply be engaging in a wash by paying the company the same price ($10.00) as
she would if she were to purchase the stock in the open market ($10.00).
10. Even when the exercise of the option would not produce an instant profit to the
employee, a well-intentioned employee, seeking to acquire his company's stock, might
still exercise his option at a wash (i.e., notwithstanding the fact that the stock's market
price is equal to the exercise price) if he wants to provide the company with capital (as
opposed to acquiring stock in the open market and paying some unknown third party
seller, instead of the company, for his stock).
11. When a company's stock price is higher, it, as a form of currency, goes further.
Thus, a company with a higher stock price may be more willing to use its own stock
(instead of cash) as currency in connection with acquisitions, as the company can part
with fewer of its shares when it makes an acquisition. Cf., e.g., Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman
& Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that company's misleading
picture of financial health inflated its stock price and allowed it to make lucrative
acquisitions of other companies and borrow money at lower rates).
12. See Herbert S. Wander, Current Issues in Corporate Governance and
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the option, the company receives an infusion of capital through the
employee's payment to the company of the option's exercise price.13
However, as all investors know, stock prices do not always go up.
When they do not, the value of a company's stock option plan to its
employees is diminished. When the market price for a company's stock
falls below the exercise price of the stock option, the options are often
referred to as being "underwater." 5 In such a case, the plan becomes
less valuable to employees, who must now see an even greater increase
in stock yrice before they can hope to profit from the exercise of their
options.
If the stock option plan is a significant part of an employee's
compensation package, the employee with underwater options may feel
that, in the absence of repricing, such options are worthless and that she
has lost a significant fringe benefit. Hence, the employee may entertain
the prospects of other employment, offering more attractive
compensation packages. Additionally, potential employees may not
consider the company as offering competitive compensation. Consistent
with this, some companies have expressed a fear that without repricing
underwater options, they cannot attract and retain high quality
employees or management. This statement might be characterized as
Executive Compensation, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN
FEDERAL SECURITES LAW, July 24, 1997, at 545, 604, available in Westlaw, SC09 ALI-
ABA 545 ("[U]sing stock options makes better use of the Company's limited resources
while offering the promise of higher reward for higher team accomplishment.").
13. At that point, the company's stock is actually issued to the employee.
14. See Joann S. Lublin, Market Slide Destroys Value of Options for Many CEOs,
Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.public.wsj.
comlcareers/resourcesldocuments/19980901-lublin.htm> (reporting that the market
decline of Fall 1998 imposed large paper losses on CEOs with significant stock options).
15. See Hewitt Newsstand: Publications Catalog: Underwater Stock Options
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http:l/www.hewittassoc.com/newslreprtlreprtO29.htm>
(defining "underwater" options as "options where the underlying stock price has fallen
below the option exercise price") [hereinafter Hewitt Newsstand].
16. For example, assume that one year after the grant of an option with a $10.00
exercise price, the company's stock is trading at $5.00 per share. Exercising the option
by paying the company $10.00 for one share of stock would make no sense for the
employee because he would be purchasing stock for twice the price that he could buy it
in the open market and accordingly twice the price that he could resell it in the open
market. For a recent article on the pervasive decline of options value in the dot-com
industry, see Shawn Tully, The Party's Over, FORTUNE, June 26, 2000, at 156, 157
("Glenn Davis of Next Step Recruiting targets new-economy sales managers whose
options have tanked: 'The first question I ask is, 'What are your options worth?' If the
answer is nothing, candidates you couldn't budge six months ago are often anxious to
move."').
17. See, e.g., General Datacomm Indus., Inc. v. Wisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818,
819 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing company claim that, in response to institutional
investor's proposed option repricing bylaw, requiring it to "submit option repricing to
stockholders at the next annual meeting or at a special meeting is both cumbersome and
untimely and would effectively eliminate the ability to reprice options for employees
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management's repricing mantra.1"
To preserve the value of the stock option plan, companies faced with
this "underwater" situation may "reprice" their employees' stock options
or, in other words, lower the exercise price of the options to the stock's
current market price or some price close to it.' 9 Instead of repricing
employee stock options, companies may also issue "exchange" or
replacement options, whereby the employee trades the company her
existing options for options with lower exercise prices. Companies
might also cancel or terminate the old options or simply let them expire
and issue new ones with lower exercise prices in their place. Companies
may choose between these alternatives, in part, because they may be
constrained by the terms of the employee stock option plan."
In any event, the economic problem remains the same, and its
resolution has the economic effect of restoring value to underwater
employee stock options.2' The effect of such an action is to make it once
again attractive for an employee to hold stock options. 2  With lower
priced options in hand, the employee has a much greater chance of
making money from the exercise of her stock options (assuming the
company's stock price rises above the now reduced 
exercise price).t
Because a company's board of directors is authorized to manage the
who are otherwise leaving their employment"); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 220
0(el. 1979) (finding that proposed resolution sought ratification of option repricing in
order to keep "executive benefits comparable to those of other corporations").
18. Not all companies agree with this mantra. See Wander, supra note 12, at 604
(discussing stock option plan at Campbell's prohibits repricing).
19. Although private companies may also provide stock option plans, the
phenomenon of repricing discussed in this article is principally associated with public
companies whose stock trades on exchanges and, therefore, for which there is a
fluctuating market price.
20. See, e.g., Stemerman v. Ackerman, 184 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 1962) (discussing
derivative action alleging that stock options granted to certain employees and officers
violated terms of company's stock option plan).
21. Unless noted to the contrary, this Article will use the umbrella term "repricing"
to refer to any or all of these alternative structures.
22. One commentator has expressed the critical view that "[o]ptions are a free ride
for management-no cost, no risk on the down side, only wins-and in those cases
where the market goes the wrong way, repricing and a new start." Robert A.G. Monks,
Executive and Director Compensation: 1984 Redux, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 317, 323, available in Westlaw, SC53
ALI-ABA 317.
23. See Kathy B. Ruxton, SWIB Tries to Block Repricing, 15 IRRC CORP.
GOVERNANCE BULL. 13 (Apr.-June 1998) ("[W]ith the stroke of a pen," option repricing
turns "worthless options.., into 'in-the-money' options.").
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company's affairs,2 any repricing decision would generally be made by
the board.25 At first blush, one might assess a board's repricing decision
as a reasonable business judgment. Without a cash outlay, the board has
salvaged the company's stock option plan and restored the employees'
coveted perk. At the same time, a potential exodus of employees has
been prevented. Moreover, as the lower exercise price makes it more
likely that the option will ultimately be exercised, the company is more
likely to receive a capital infusion.
However, as discussed herein, it is not quite that simple. Shareholders
do not always share the view that repricing is necessary, or even
positive, for a company.2 This is especially true if those who stand to
benefit from the option repricing include directors whom the
shareholders perceive to be responsible for the depressed stock price.
This Article analyzes if and when shareholders can attack option
repricing, giving special attention to the case of option repricing that
benefits directors. In Part II, this Article will discuss shareholders'
objections, in general, to option repricing. Part IIT will discuss the
fiduciary duties of directors implicated in the repricing decision. Part IV
will then examine the effect of the business judgment rule in insulating
directors from liability associated with repricing decisions and other
obstacles to those challenging option repricing through litigation. Part V
explores whether there is an effective alternative to litigation to deal
with the repricing problem, namely, monitoring and lobbying by
institutional shareholders.
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
25. Frequently, boards delegate the authority to set executive compensation to
compensation committees. See Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness,
46 Bus. LAW. 241, 249-50 (1990).
26. For example, if a stock's current market price is $5.00 per share and the
original exercise price is $25.00 per share, it is far more likely that the employee's
options will be exercised if the strike price is reduced to $5.00 per share. This is because
the chances are greater that the market price will exceed $5.00 than $25.00.
27. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (1979) (accusing board of waste
as a result of option repricing). See also Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The
Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
31 (2000) (finding shareholders particularly sensitive to effects of dilution with stock
option plans and that repricing provisions are significant sources of opposition to such
plans).
28. The law of Delaware is primarily examined herein because of the large number
of companies that have incorporated under Delaware law and because Delaware is the
state with the most developed body of corporate law. See Julie L.Y. Huan, The
Director's Duty of Care: A Comparative Analysis of Delaware and Singapore Laws, 12
COLUM. J. AsiAN L. 279, 280 (1998) ("Delaware's prominence as the domicile of large
corporations has resulted in its having one of the most developed and litigated
corporation laws in the United States."); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory
of Indeterminancy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1925-26 (1998)
(commenting that Delaware is the leader in corporate chartering).
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Finally, Part VI concludes that challenges to option repricing raise
many of the same issues long associated with all types of executive
compensation cases.2 ' However, option repricing, especially under the
circumstances where directors stand to benefit from it, presents a unique
problem. In such a case, the directors may have responsibilities to
critically assess both a stock option plan's value and the impact of their
own performance on the plan's value-responsibilities that may be at
odds with their interests as option-holding shareholders. When directors
fail to faithfully discharge these responsibilities, shareholders should be
able to reliably resort to derivative litigation for redress.
II. SHAREHOLDER OBJECTIONS TO OPTION REPRICING
While management often claims that option repricing is beneficial to
companies, non-employee shareholders frequently complain about
repricing." Not considered in the discussion above, the perspective of
the long-suffering shareholder may be different from those of directors
and employees.
A. The Risk of Ownership
The purpose of stock option plans is often cited as giving employees
an ownership interest in the company that they work for in order to more
closely align their interests with those of the shareholders.3 ' Disgruntled
shareholders will assure anyone willing to listen that ownership is not
exclusively a bowl of cherries. Non-employee shareholders did not
receive the luxury of a "free" option, but instead bought the company's
29. For a detailed discussion of executive compensation issues, see Carl T. Bogus,
Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF.
L. REv. 1 (1993). For an outline of the pertinent issues, see Joseph E. Bachelder,
Current Issues and Developments in Executive Compensation, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES, Nov. 12, 1998, at
699, available in Westlaw, SD39 ALI-ABA 699.
30. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Derivative Action Litig., 189 F.R.D. 117, 126
(D.N.J. 1999) (discussing, in a shareholder derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary
duty, plaintiff's allegation that option "repricing provided the[] defendants with a benefit
in excess of $100 million and caused [the company] to be severely criticized by Wall
Street"); Bergmann v. Lee Data Corp., 467 N.W.2d 636, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that plaintiff, suing for wrongful termination, also presented a stockholder
proposal alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by chairman in recommending option
repricing without regard to performance).
31. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 557-62.
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stock at the then prevailing market price in the hopes of an upturn.
These shareholders have fully beared the risk of a downturn. They may
have stuck by a company through positive and negative business cycles,
and, at the point of the board's decision to reprice, may be holding a
depressed stock for which the immediate prospects may not be very
good.32 These non-employee shareholders face the tough decision of
selling their stock at a certain loss or facing the uncertainty of continuing
to hold the stock in the hopes of a recovery."
In contrast, option grantees, some of whom may already be very well,
if not excessively, compensated by other means, 4 are spared the
dilemma of whether or not to sell their stock. The repricing
instantaneously and risklessly resolves the problem of a depressed stock
price for them.35 Ownership traditionally promises the potential for
reward, but only in return for the risk of loss. Repricing, however,
makes the risk/reward picture asymmetrical in favor of the option
grantee,36 who is certainly along for the ride on the stock's ascent, but
has the benefit of the repricing safety net on the way down.37 Thus, non-
employee shareholders may believe that stock option repricing makes a
mockery of true ownership. Such is not, however, the shareholder's
only basis for objecting to option repricing.
32. Moreover, these shareholders, unlike the option holders, do not have the
"repricing fairy" to assist them with this problem; their only hope of salvaging this
investment is for the market price of the stock to rebound.
33. Neither alternative for the shareholder is attractive. Nevertheless, this is the
risk that the shareholder voluntarily assumed at the outset.
34. See generally GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExcEss: THE
OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN ExEcuTivEs (1991); Linda J. Barris, The
Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68
IND. L.J. 59 (1992).
35. See Timothy D. Schellhardt, Scores of Luck, Managers Enjoy Unusual Stock-
Option Windfall, Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition (visited Sept. 2, 2000) <http:ll
public.wsj.com/careers/resources/documents/19990604-schellhardt.htm>. Schellhardt
reports an interview with a compensation consultant who stated:
The issue for me is pulling the trigger too soon. Many people have gotten used
to very big gains in their options driven by a bull market, and when the market
goes down, they think a right of theirs has been taken away. The knee-jerk
reaction is, "Let's fix that right now."
Id. See also infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
36. As one scholar noted, repricing "allows directors to remove effectively the
downside risk of performance pay while maintaining some semblance of a competitive
compensation." Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance
Comnpensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 151
(1995). See also hifra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
37. See Michael Griffis, In Stocks Today (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
<http:/fstocks.about.com/money/stocks/library/weekly/aao2l799.htm?terms=02/17/99+
%26+option+repricing> ("Option repricing eliminates risk. It rewards management for
good stock prices and bad. Investors should be so fortunate."). See also infra notes 22-
23 and accompanying text.
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B. Shareholder Dilution
Another economic effect on shareholders is that of dilution. Dilution
is any situation that reduces a shareholder's ownership interest
(expressed as a percentage of the whole) in a company." Dilution often
occurs when an employee exercises a stock option. Upon the option's
exercise, the company issues a share of its stock to the employee and the
holdings of all pre-existing shareholders are to some degree diluted."
Hence, most employee stock option plans present the threat of dilution.4"
Option repricing makes the threat of dilution more real. As the market
price of the company's stock is more likely to exceed the exercise price,
employees will be more likely to exercise their options. The more likely
it is that employees will exercise their options, the more likely it is that
shareholders will be harmed by dilution.41
C. The Impact on Capitalization
Yet another objectionable aspect of repricing is that it potentially
deprives the company of useful capitalization. Every penny by which
the exercise price is reduced is one that the company will not receive
when the repriced options are exercised.42  Repricing, therefore, may
deprive the company of capital, which could have enhanced the
38. See, e.g., In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 330 (Del. 1993)
(discussing allegations of harm suffered by minority shareholders through alleged
dilution).
39. As an illustration, assume a shareholder owns 100 shares of a company that
has 1000 shares outstanding. At that point, the shareholder owns 10% of the company.
However, if options are exercised causing the corporation to issue another 1000 shares,
then the shareholder's interest has been diluted to 5% (because the shareholder still owns
only 100 out of the now increased total of 2000 shares outstanding). If the company
thereafter is sold for $1,000,000.00, the shareholder (now owning only 5% of the
company) will receive only $50,000, as opposed to the $100,000.00 that he would have
received had he continued to own 10% of the corporation.
40. The threat of dilution would not be present if the company were to buy back a
corresponding number of shares when options are exercised. Under these circumstances,
the dilution resulting from the exercise of the stock options (and the accompanying
issuance of stock) would be negated by the buyback. In other words, the total number of
outstanding shares in the company would remain constant, as would the shareholder's
relative ownership interest. See also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. See Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era
of Pay for Performance, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 271, 295 (1999) (stating that
stockholders are hurt when their shares are diluted by large option grants to CEOs).
42. For instance, if an exercise price is lowered from $10.00 to $7.00, the company
will receive $3.00 less per share upon the exercise of the option.
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company's financial condition. 3  Option repricing may also be
interpreted by investors as an insider vote of "no confidence" in the
ability of the company's stock price to recover.' Attitudes such as this




There are still other reasons why shareholders may resent option
repricing. Many of these relate to their perceptions of management's
performance. Shareholders may object to repricing, noting that repricing
of stock options "undermine[s] the performance-based nature of stock
option awards" 6 and essentially rewards management for "poor
performance of the company's stock."47 Although the stock price may
not precisely measure management's performance,48 shareholders, and
accordingly management, often use the company's stock price as a
43. The deprivation is not certain, though, as the market price of the stock must
still exceed the new exercise price before the option will be exercised. Nevertheless,
assuming that the repriced option is ultimately exercised, the company will receive less
money than it would have received under the former, higher exercise price.
44. See Heather M. Stone, Repricing Public Company Stock Options: The
Dilemma Deepens for Investors (visited Sept. 29, 2000) <http://www.tht.com/
vuwinter99repricing.htm>.
Opponents argue that option repricing rewards poor performance, particularly
when senior management participates in the repricing. Furthermore, repricings
sever the alignment of shareholder and employee interests, as shareholders do
not reap the same repricing benefits for their stock. Finally, repricing options,
which is disclosed in a company's financial statements, may signal to the
markets that the company lacks confidence its stock price will recover lost
value.
Id.
45. It may be that option repricing is more of a threat to companies with small
capitalizations than large established publicly held companies. First, "small caps" are
often already undercapitalized and in need of additional funds; hence, the impact of the
potential capital forgone by the company due to the repricing may be relatively greater.
Also, if these companies have small amounts of stock outstanding, the effects of dilution
(upon the exercise of the repriced options) may be more pronounced. Finally, smaller
companies usually lack institutional investors and analyst coverage, which otherwise
might serve as deterrents to option repricing due to the watchdog function large investors
often serve. See discussion hifra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
46. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The
Changing Face of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 43, 94 (1998).
47. Id.
48. See Statutory Stock Options, supra note 6 ("Empirical research shows that over
one-half of the variance in a company's stock price is due to industry factors, stock
market trends, and macroeconomic conditions. These conditions cannot be influenced
by executive performances."). See also Executive "Stock Unit" Retirement Plan Invalid
as Bearing No Reasonable Relation to Value of Services Performed, 72 HARV. L. REV.
375, 375-76 (1958-1959) (discussing case invalidating stock plan where court found that
factors other than management's ability influenced company's stock price).
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measure of executive performance."9 It is not unusual to see a
company's officers and directors claim credit for outstanding stock price
performance.'0 It is much less common to see such executives assume
responsibility for poor stock price performance."
In any event, whatever its short-comings as a performance index may
be, market price does measure shareholders' principal concern about the
profitability of their investment." Consequently, shareholders may
perceive that the fallen stock price and the attendant "need" for repricing
are circumstances created by poor management, not the vagaries of the
market.53 In addition, it is not lost on shareholders that typically the
"employees" who benefit the most from repricing are the company's
officers and directors, the same people that shareholders perceive as
creating the "need" for repricing.
Shareholders may also take issue with management's contention that
repricing is necessary to attract and retain high quality employees.
Where management is already under contract to remain with the
company for a fixed term into the future, shareholders may question
what the company gains through option repricing." This argument that
49. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider
Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 309, 344 n.204 (1989)
("Management's attention is usually focused on short-term returns that are quickly
reflected in the company's stock prices.").
50. See, e.g., Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 385 (Del. Ch. 1997) (allowing
corporation's chief executive officer award of 1,000,000 options due to company's
performance under his tenure and dramatic increase in its market value during that time).
51. See, e.g., Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1042-43 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that
directors had almost tripled their compensation during a five-year period when
company's performance, measured by earnings and stock price, had been poor). See also
Garber v. Lego, 11 F.3d 1197, 1204 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing large compensation
awards granted by directors notwithstanding huge loss suffered by company); In re
General Homes Corp., 199 B.R. 148, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that directors of
insolvent company sought compensation on par with what solvent companies paid their
directors); Biggins v. Garvey, 630 N.E.2d 44, 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding that
CEO of company received salary increases while company was in a "dismal" state).
52. While it is often said that one of the primary goals of a public company should
be to maximize shareholders' wealth, not all commentators agree with this view. See,
e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REv. 247, 249 (1999) ("[W]e take issue with both the prevailing principal-
agent model of the public corporation and the shareholder wealth maximization goal that
underlies it.").
53. Therefore, these shareholders reject management's contention that repricing is
necessary because management has been "harmed unfairly by adverse market
conditions." Kreinberg, supra note 36, at 151.
54. An analogous argument was unsuccessfully made in Zupnick, 698 A.2d at 386,
where a shareholder complained of a large grant of options to company's chief executive
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the company gains nothing from repricing, however, would probably not
apply to non-management level employees, most of whom are
employees at will. Shareholders may also contend that the company's
employees, particularly its executives, remain bound by their fiduciary
obligations in the absence of repricing.55 Thus, the financial benefit of
option repricing is not necessary (and hence a wasteful method) to
ensure that the employees do what they are already legally obligated to
do.
56
Moreover, shareholders challenging the mantra might question why it
would be in the corporation's best interest to make any effort to retain
the very executives who appear to be responsible for the current woes of
the company and its stock price. In fact, if a refusal to reprice were to
trigger management's departure, the sentiment of shareholders might be
"good riddance."
To summarize, when a company's stock has sharply declined,
shareholders will be cognizant of who benefits from the decision to
reprice and who makes the decision to reprice. The very management
that shareholders are displeased with often includes employees that will
be the direct beneficiaries of the option repricing. Furthermore, it is
these same individuals, or those closely associated with them, who
frequently make the repricing decision. As one critic of option repricing
said, "It is like the captain of the Titanic hitting the iceberg,
commandeering a life boat for himself and then giving himself a bonus
for having courageously overcome such dire circumstances. '
officer based upon past achievements. The shareholder argued that the executive was"already [contractually] required to perform [those services] and... had been amply
compensated" for doing so. Id.
55. One would expect these shareholders to have little sympathy for those
claiming that their underwater options are of "no positive motivational use." Kreinberg,
supra note 36, at 152-53.
56. Such an argument has had mixed success. See Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F.
Supp. 234, 241 (D. Del. 1975) (holding that even absent agreement by employee to
remain in employ of company, consideration for option grant may be found where option
plan prevents employee from exercising option unless he first renders substantial
services to company). But see Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1956)
(finding where no consideration for issuance of options existed at time of grant,
subsequent execution of employment contracts by employees came too late to constitute
consideration).
57. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Compensation of the Chief Executive Officer
and Directors of Publicly Held Corporations, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INSTrTUTE, Oct. 7, 1999, at 103, 108, available in Westlaw, SE 39 ALI-
ABA 103 (observing that CEO compensation often bears little relationship to
performance, as measured by increases in the wealth of shareholders).
58. This quote is attributed to Mark J. Heise, an amateur investor and attorney
practicing commercial litigation in Miami, Florida with the law firm of Heise Markarian
& Foreman, P.A.
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Shareholders may see no exaggeration in this statement. 9
From this perspective, repricing is nothing more than a windfall to an
undeserving and self-dealing employee. If a company's officers and
directors have played a significant role in the drop in the stock priceo
and participated in the decision to reprice and benefited from the
repricing scheme, the shareholders' lament becomes not only a
sympathetic one, but one that may be successfully translated into
lawsuits alleging breaches of fiduciary duty or waste in connection with
the option repricing.6 ' Nevertheless, as discussed above, repricing may
have legitimate uses and may represent the exercise of reasonable
business judgment. Drawing a distinction between these two scenarios
requires an understanding of what the law of fiduciary obligation
demands of directors making repricing decisions.
1Il. FIDucIARY DuTIES IN THE CONTEXT OF OPTION REPRICING
As with all business decisions made on behalf of a corporation by its
directors, decisions regarding option repricing must be evaluated in light
59. An expert commenting on the practice of repricing noted this shareholder
perspective as the principal "danger" of repricing:
If stock option repricing is not done very carefully and with the full approval
of major shareholders, the company's actions can backfire through shareholder
discontent. Shareholders in the company may grow angry that they are forced
to take the brunt of the falling stock price, while certain option holders lose
little value and are relatively untouched by a sliding stock price. If the
company is publicly traded, it may find out quicker than expected that
shareholders without options don't approve of the repricing scheme. Repricing
options is often viewed as counterproductive to the intended purpose of equity
compensation-using the option grants to tie employees [sic] interest to
corporate performance. In addition, if a company reprices options too
regularly, it may be perceived by employees who own stock options that they
do not need to care much about the overall stock price, because their vested
value in options will be relatively safe either way. When option repricing
becomes common, employees win when the stock goes up, and when the stock
price falls. The purpose of an option should be a motivation in good times and
a motivation to improve in bad times.
Ryan Stanley, When Wall Street Causes the Jitters: Repricing Stock Options in Tough
Markets (visited July 29,2000) <http:llwww.fed.orglonlinemaglnov98/tips.html>.
60. Such things as mismanagement or intentional wrongdoing contribute to
declining stock prices.
61. One might argue that by buying stock in a company, shareholders assume the
risk of both mismanagement and option repricing. While that may be so, it cannot be
said that the corporation assumes the risk of conflicted or grossly negligent decision-
making by a company's board of directors and, therefore, should not be able to recover
for breaches of fiduciary duty.
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of these agents' fiduciary responsibilities to the corporation.62 In a
general sense, corporate fiduciary duties break down into two general
categories: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.6
The duty of care essentially requires a company's directors to exercise
the same level of care as ordinarily prudent persons in like positions
would exercise under similar circumstances.6 The issue of whether
directors have met their duty of care65 generally turns on whether they
acted in an informed manner,66 without gross negligence67 and without
committing a waste of corporate assets.6 In a similar fashion, the duty
of loyalty requires directors to act with an undivided, unselfish loyalty to
the corporation.69 The issue of whether directors have met their duty of
loyalty generally focuses on whether such agents, in carrying out their
responsibilities, refrained from self-dealing and placed the interests of
62. This discussion assumes that the plaintiff bringing a claim to challenge option
repricing does not face any ethical quandaries regarding frivolous claims or assertions.
In other words, the assumption is that the facts support the allegations discussed. While
the following discussion speaks of two potential claims (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty of
care and breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty), it may be that in any given scenario none,
one, both, or perhaps more might legitimately be asserted.
Any legal analysis of directors' breach of fiduciary duty regarding a business decision
in which they participated requires that consideration be given to the business judgment
rule. This section of the Article will address the former, and the following section the
latter.
63. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
Common law also provides that a director has a fiduciary duty of disclosure to
shareholders. See Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 537 (Del.
1996). When the board of directors seeks shareholders' approval or other action, this
duty of disclosure requires directors to fully and fairly disclose "all material information
within the board's control." Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). See also
infra notes 71, 166-70 and accompanying text.
64. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (1985) ("A director shall discharge
his duties as a director... with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances...."); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.30(b)
(1998) (stating that a director "shall discharge [his] duties with the care that a person in a
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances."). See
also Orlett v. Cincinnati Microwave, Inc., 953 F.2d 224, 229 (6th Cir. 1990); Meyers v.
Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982).
65. One scholar has referred to the duty of care as essentially a "duty of attention."
See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention:
Tine for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1477 (1984).
66. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that, prior to
making business decisions, directors must inform themselves of "all material information
reasonably available to them"), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
67. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del.
1989).
68. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("[W]aste entails
an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie
beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.").
69. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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the corporation ahead of their own. '
Both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty make demands on
directors in the context of option repricing. Before one can establish
whether directors should be entitled to protection for the decisions that
they make in repricing options, it is necessary to understand these
demands in the relevant context.
1
In considering the following discussions of the duty of care and duty
of loyalty in the repricing context, it is important to remember that a
plaintiff may demonstrate a breach of the duty of care (procedural or
substantive), irrespective of whether the directors who made the
repricing decision benefited from it. To demonstrate a breach of the
duty of loyalty, however, the plaintiff will have to demonstrate that the
directors who made the decision to reprice either benefited from it, or
were dominated or controlled by (or not independent of) those who did
benefit. 2
A. The Procedural Duty of Care
In the famous (or infamous) case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 73 the
Delaware Supreme Court expounded on the directors' fiduciary duty,
commonly referred to as the procedural duty of care.74 While the
70. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
71. In addition to the directors' fiduciary obligations under common law, directors
must also concern themselves with the disclosure obligations imposed by the federal
securities laws. See generally Patrick J. Straka, Comment, Executive Compensation
Disclosure: The SEC's Attempt to Facilitate Market Forces, 72 NEB. L. REv. 803
(1993).
72. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429-30 (Del. 1997) (stating
that use of independent directors to evaluate sale proposal of part interest in corporation
controlled by individual shareholder to second corporation controlled by same
shareholder did not shift burden of proof on fairness issue from defendants to plaintiff
because board was not diligent and its most active member had ties to the controlling
shareholder); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936-37 (Del. 1993) (discussing, in
context of alleging demand futility, complaint alleged that director dominated and
controlled other board members and company's officers); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
73. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
74. Commentators have discussed the Van Gorkom case extensively. See
generally, e.g., Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging
Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1985); Bayless Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1 (1985)
(suggesting, among other things, that directors take their time and fully inform
themselves of all material details prior to making corporate decisions); Stephen A.
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backdrop for this case was merger negotiations,75 its lessons nonetheless
inform all director decision-making, including those in the context of
option repricing. The basic lesson of Van Gorkom is that directors face
liability for breach of the procedural duty of care if they are grossly
negligent in failing to adequately inform themselves regarding a decision
before them. In Van Gorkoin, this meant, among other things, that the
directors were required to investigate and question valuations of the
company." For the present purpose, the question is what the meaning of
Van Gorkom is in the context of option repricing decisions.
Experts suggest a laundry list of items that directors should consider in
making repricing decisions. For instance, one consultant suggests that
companies should not necessarily have the same policy for executives as
for other employees7' In the case of the latter, the need for repricing
may be more pressing because the options represent a significant
component of their basic pay."° In the executives' case, however, options
"are explicitly awarded as incentives to help grow shareholder wealth.""1
Therefore, directors may appropriately exclude executives' options from
repricing.
Additionally, this expert suggests that directors must contemplate the
effects of the repricing." Here, he is critical of the repricing mantra,
stating that it would be useful to have outside experts assess whether,
without repricing, valued employees will really leave.!3 Directors should
Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1987); Bryan C. Bacon, Note, Redefining Director Liability il Duty
of Care Cases: The Delaware Supreme Court Narrows Van Gorkom, 61 Mo. L. REv.
663 (1996); Patricia A. Terian, Comment, "It's Not Polite to Ask Questions" in the
Boardroom: Van Gorkom's Due Care Standard Minimized in Paramount v. QVC, 44
BuiF. L. REv. 887 (1996).
75. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866-70.
76. See id. at 873-81.
77. See id. at 876-77.




81. Id. "In fact, by law, companies paying executives over $1 million are limited
in the tax deductions they can take for such pay unless it is performance related. If
options are repriced every time stock goes down significantly, it is not clear that these
options are really contingent on performance." Id. See also I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2000)
(in public companies, no deduction for "applicable employee remuneration" to extent
remuneration to such employee exceeds $1,000,000); Edward E. Bintz, The New $1
Million Linit on the Deductibility of Executive Compensation, 7 NO. II INSIGHTS 2, 2
(1993) ("The recently enacted limitation on the tax deductibility of executive
compensation in excess of $1 million will have a significant impact on the structuring of
compensation packages, the composition of board compensation committees, and the
information disclosed to, and the vote required of, shareholders.").
82. See Rosen, supra note 78.
83. See id.
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also consider what impact the repricing may have (if any) upon the
company's financial statements or tax position. 4 Thus, "any decision to
reprice... should be discussed with tax.., and audit advisors."
Moreover, directors should take into account what consideration,
services, or other value the corporation is getting or will get in return for
the act of repricing. "For instance, option holders might be asked to give
back some of the shares they currently hold, restart vesting, face
blackout periods when they cannot exercise the new options, or some
combination of all three. 8 6
Furthermore, directors should also be aware of what the stock option
plan provides with respect to option repricing. Legal counsel should be
called upon to answer such questions as whether the plan permits
repricing and, if so, whether the directors are authorized to undertake
such action without the approval of the shareholders. In connection with
repricing, it is not uncommon for derivative plaintiffs' to contest the
directors' authority to act as they did, or to assert that the directors acted
in contravention of the stock option plan.8 Related to this, directors
must consider the structure of the repricing. It might be in a myriad of
forms, from simply resetting the option price to the current market value,
84. The accounting and tax issues presented by repricing are beyond the scope of
this Article. For a discussion of these issues, see generally Hewitt Newsstand, supra note
15; Tully, supra note 16. See generally Joseph McLaughlin, Accounting Agenda: A
Flurry of Proposals, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRAcTIcE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE 2000, May-June, 2000, at
1039, available in Westlaw, 1176 PLI/CoRp. 1039; Joseph McLaughlin, Issues and
Outlook 2000: Waiting on the Sidelines for Final Statements, PRACTISING LAWv INSTITUTE
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: CONDUCTING DUE
DILLIGENCE 2000, May-June, 2000, at 1009, available in Westlaw, 1176 PLI/CoRP.
1009.
85. Hewitt Newsstand, supra note 15.
86. Rosen, supra note 78. Vesting is a "right an employee gradually acquires by
length of service at a company to receive employer-contributed benefits." See
BARRON'S, supra note 2, at 675-76.
87. Derivative actions permit a company's shareholder to sue wrongdoers on
behalf of the company where the company has failed to do so. See Thomas P. Kinney,
Comment, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility Where the Board Fails to
Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 172, 172 (1994).
88. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that
plaintiff failed to create any issue of material fact concerning board's authority to
terminate certain options and issue others at a lower price and concerning disclosure of
this transaction in proxy statement, placing burden on plaintiff to show waste, and
holding that plaintiff could not carry that burden); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211,
224 (Del. 1979) (claiming that board lacked authority to permit options to be exchanged
for those with lower exercise price).
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to extending the exercise period, or to issuing new lower priced
options."
Finally, another expert recommends that a long-term perspective is the
correct one in repricing decisions.90 In other words, directors should not
rush to reprice options at the first sign that the company's stock price is
in trouble. Repricing should not be undertaken to address something as
transitory as a temporary market decline.9
While the law of fiduciary duty has typically resisted requiring, as a
matter of law, any particular course of conduct,' the above provides a
guide to directors seeking to comply with their procedural duty of care.
To successfully challenge whether this duty has been met, a plaintiff
must establish that the directors departed in a grossly negligent manner
from the road map described above.93 Thus, the plaintiff would have to
demonstrate that, prior to making the option repricing decision, the
directors failed to adequately inform themselves as to all material issues
raised by the repricing decision, including such things as the effect of the
repricing, or available alternatives to repricing.4
Such a plaintiff must also brace for the directors' defense. The
directors are likely to respond that both the amount of attention to be
given to a matter and what information to consider in connection
therewith are, in and of themselves, matters of business judgment and
89. While all of these may not technically be considered repricing, they have the
same economic effect. See supra notes 19-20.
90. See Despite Ongoing Market Volatility, Most Companies are Resisting Stock
Option Repricing, Towers Perrin Study Finds (visited December 14, 1998)
<http:llwww.towers.comltowers/news/pr981214.html>. In the same release making
these recommendations, it is reported that, following the market downturn in the Fall of
1998, 85% of the respondents to a survey of 148 mid-sized to large companies, nearly all
with underwater options, nonetheless stated that they were not considering any repricing.
See id. Paula Todd, a principal and a senior consultant on executive compensation who
believes that repricing should be the exception rather than the rule, stated:
The fact that so many companies are holding their ground in this volatile
environment suggests a real commitment to preserving the intent of stock
option programs, especially in terms of building both risk and reward into the
equation.... This also shows clearly in the main reason that respondents gave
for avoiding repricing [namely, that it undermines the purpose of long-term
incentives].
Id.
91. Additionally, "[riepricings are more appropriate for lower-level managers and
employees than for top executives, who generally have more direct influence on stock
price movement and should be held accountable for bad decisions by losing the
opportunity for option gains." Id. Towers Perrin recommends that the recipients of
repriced options be required to make some sacrifice. See id.
92. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985) (holding that an
independent valuation study or fairness opinion is not always required as a matter of
law).
93. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
94. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876.
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that the consideration they received was "adequate."" Another related
argument taken from the dissent in Van Gorkom would be that the
business acumen and experience possessed by the directors inherently
supplemented whatever other consideration was given to the matter.96
In trying to prove a breach of the procedural duty of care, a plaintiff in
an option repricing case may take comfort in Van Gorkom.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff must be cognizant of the fact that Van
Gorkom is one of the few cases in which plaintiffs have established such
a breach.97 Additionally, it may be difficult to establish such a breach
because the basic lesson of Van Gorkom probably has not been lost on
most directors.
B. The Substantive Duty of Due Care
A director's fiduciary duty of care has another component, sometimes
referred to as the duty of substantive due care.9" This responsibility is
said by some to be related to, or one in the same as, the responsibility of
directors to refrain from committing waste of the corporation's assets."
95. Id.
96. See id. at 894-95 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). See also Oberly v. Kirby, 592
A.2d 445, 472 (Del. 1991) (holding that fairness opinion is not automatically required
because in some situations "it will not significantly amplify the information already
available to directors").
97. See Ryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 133, 139 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(finding that, in context of ruling on a motion to dismiss, board had exercised due care,
and observing that "cases finding a lack of procedural due care have involved extreme
circumstances").
98. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Decker v. Clausen, No.
CIV.A.10,684, 1989 WL 133617, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 1989). See also Bradley T.
Ferrell, Note, A Hybrid Approach: Integrating the Delaware and the ALI Approaches to
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 267-68 (1999) (discussing duty
of substantive due care).
99. See Ferrell, supra note 98, at 267-68. The precise relationship between waste
and the substantive duty of care is hard to define. See, e.g, CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusiNESS ASSOCIATIONS 439 (2d ed.
1996).
The doctrines of waste, gift, and ultra vires are closely related to the doctrine
of substantive due care. They rest on a judgment that a substantive decision
could not have been the product of prudent and good faith decision-making.
Which set of doctrines is used will depend on whether an action seeks damages
against the directors for approving a confficting interest transaction, or instead
seeks to rescind the transaction itself.
Id. See also John F. Olson et al., The Board Compensation Committee Report on
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Here, the analysis focuses on whether the corporation has received
adequate consideration in any given transaction. The various
formulations of this responsibility are quite deferential to directors."°
Generally speaking, waste will be found only where the consideration
received by the company is "so inadequate in value that no person of
ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the
corporation has paid."'' One might also describe waste as arising when
the directors have put the corporation in a "no-win" situation.'
2
However, risky decisions, or even those obviously improvident with the
benefit of hindsight, rarely rise to the level of waste.'0 3
In the context of option repricing, a plaintiff trying to demonstrate the
directors' breach of their substantive duty of due care, for authorizing
the repricing, would have to prove that the company essentially received
no, or grossly inadequate, consideration in exchange for the repricing.
However, Delaware courts, the most influential in the area of corporate
law, °4 have little difficulty finding adequate consideration flowing back
to the corporation in connection with an options transaction.' 5 While
Executive Compensation: The Effect on the State Law, Fiduciary Duties of Directors, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REPORTING 1993: LIVING WITH
THE NEW RULEs 305-18 (1993).
100. See, e.g., Steiner v. Meyerson, No. CIV.A.13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1
(Del. Ch. July 19, 1995). In Steiner, the court stated that, to prove waste, plaintiffs must
show that defendants:
approved a transaction exchanging something of value for consideration so
inadequate that "no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem
it worth what the corporation has paid." If under the circumstances any
reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense, then the judicial
inquiry ends. This is obviously an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a
shareholder plaintiff.
Id. (quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
101. Saxe, 184 A.2d at 610. Some cases and commentators draw a distinction
between the doctrines of gift and waste. See, e.g., Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d
368, 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("The essence of a claim of gift is lack of consideration
and the essence of waste is the diversion of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary
purposes."). Often, in litigation, however, the distinction is not carefully drawn. This is
probably because the distinction is rarely, if ever, outcome determinative. The doctrines
are closely related and the legal analysis of such claims is similar, if not the same. This
Article often uses the term "waste" and in doing so intends that term to encompass both
doctrines where appropriate.
102. Cf. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271, 275 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that
fiduciaries' investment decision created a "'no-win' situation").
103. Cf. Daniel B. Bogart, Finding the Still Small Voice: The Liability of
Bankruptcy Trustees and the Work of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, 102
DICK. L. REv. 703, 740 n.81 (1998) ("The business judgment rule insulates directors
from liability for their poor decisions ... .
104. See supra note 28.
105. See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731,736,738-39 (Del. 1960) (holding that,
in a case alleging that stock option plan constituted invalid gifts of corporate assets,
"there must be some reasonable assurance in the plan, or the circumstances of the
particular case, which can reasonably be expected to make the corporation receive the
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agreeing with the notion that companies must reasonably expect to
receive a benefit from the issuance of stock optionso and that there must
be a reasonable relationship between the value of the options and the
benefit to the corporation, the Supreme Court of Delaware has stated that
the benefits to a corporation in connection with the issuance of stock
options may be "ephemeral and not susceptible of identification and
valuation in dollar terms.""' As a result, stock options may properly be
issued to induce key personnel to continue employment, or to expend
greater effort on behalf of the corporation °8 Such judicial deference
suggests that successful waste cases in the repricing context will be rare.
Likewise, pure duty of care cases (i.e., those lacking allegations of
conflict of interest), whether they be substantive or procedural, are few
and those imposing liability are even fewer." Hence, a plaintiff with
nothing other than an alleged breach of the duty of care is unlikely to
prevail. Allegations that directors breached their duty of loyalty may
offer more hope for plaintiffs.
C. The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty generally provides that when a director makes
decisions on behalf of the corporation, "the best interest of the
contemplated benefit," but that where reasonable, informed, and disinterested
businessmen might differ on such point, the court should not substitute its judgment).
But see Stein v. Orloff, No. 7276, 1985 WL 11561, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1985)
(holding that, although other allegations were insufficient to excuse demand, complaint
created a reasonable doubt that certain stock option repricing was done without
consideration and, hence, constituted a waste of corporate assets); Frankel v. Donovan,
120 A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1956) (finding that where no consideration for issuance of
options existed at time of grant, subsequent execution of employment contracts by
employees came too late to constitute consideration).
106. See Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952)
(holding stock option plan invalid where plan permitted certain executives to purchase
stock at price below market value but was not reasonably calculated to ensure company
would receive contemplated benefits).
107. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625-26 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253-54 (Del. 2000).
108. See id.
109. See Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and
Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 544 (1988) (noting Van Gorkom is
one of few cases holding directors liable for breaching duty of care); Dale A. Oesterle,
The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability on Hostile Takeover
Defenses, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31, 40 (1989) ("Until the early eighties, one could
find very few cases in which directors were held liable in damages for a breach of a duty
of care uncomplicated by self-dealing.").
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corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any interest
possessed by a director.""0 In other words, directors must act without
the hindrance of conflict or divided loyalties so that they are free to
objectively assess what is in the best interests of the corporation."
The duty of loyalty naturally applies to directors in connection with
the repricing of stock options." Generally, this duty presents little
difficulty in cases where the repricing does not concern options held
by the board members, senior executives, or others close to them. In
these instances, no conflict of interest or opportunity for self-dealing is
usually present, leaving the plaintiff with whatever case he can make
alleging a breach of the duty of care. When repricing does concern
directors' options,"' however, breaches of the duty of loyalty are a
realistic possibility, as they are in many cases involving executive
compensation."4
The specter of conflict is in the backdrop of all decisions regarding
executive compensation."' In the simplest case, it is easy to see the
conflict issue where, for example, all members of the board are "inside"
directors and executive employees of the corporation. " ' In any decision
by the board to set their own pay, the directors are conflicted because
they stand on both sides of the transactions. On one hand, they are duty
bound to subordinate their self-interests to further those of the
corporation, which would like to obtain the executives' services at the
lowest cost. On the other hand, consistent with their self-interests, these
directors would like to receive the highest pay possible for their services.
The interests of the directors and the corporation are, hence, drawn into
direct conflict.
110. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
111. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
112. An obvious example of a board of directors' breach of their duty of loyalty
would be if they decided to reprice options not because the repricing was in the best
interests of the corporation, but because the value of their own stock options had fallen.
113. In the course of this discussion, this Article may refer only to directors in this
regard. This does not mean that the analysis herein cannot or should not be extended to
the options of other officers, senior executives, or employees where the relationships and
circumstances among the decision makers and the beneficiaries in the repricing suggest
conflict of interest, lack of independence, or self-dealing.
114. See generally, e.g., Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 21,
1997, at 58 (analyzing the explosive rise in executive pay and the growing protests of
shareholders).
115. Executive compensation is generally set by a company's board of directors,
who are authorized to manage the company's business affairs. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 141(a) (1991). See also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
116. This would not occur in a company traded on the New York Stock Exchange,
as any such company must have at least two "outside" directors (i.e., directors that are
not employees of the company). See NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., NEw YORK STOCK
EXCHANGF LsTED COMPANY MANUAL 303.00-303.01 (Supp. 13, 1999).
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Consistent with the above, a plaintiff complaining of management's
option repricing would attempt to characterize what transpired as an act
of self-dealing on the part of the directors who made the repricing
decision.'17 The plaintiff would have to, at a minimum, establish that the
decision makers (the board or a committee appointed by the board) were
either suffering from a disabling conflict of interest, or were otherwise
not independent."8
For example, assume a board consists of three members, all of whom,
in addition to being directors, are key employees of the corporation.
Moreover, all have received stock options pursuant to an employee stock
option plan."9  Assume further that the company's stock price has
collapsed and the board has elected to reprice all of the employee stock
options, including their own.' These facts provide the basis for
allegations concerning conflict of interest but, despite this, the directors
may still be able to establish that the repricing was fair to the
corporation.'
2'
Plaintiff's case would undoubtedly be stronger if management's
blunders brought about the drop in the company's stock price.'2 If
117. Of course, this argument would not be available if the executives did not have
their own options repriced. See Peter C. Clapman, Current Major Initiatives of TIAA-
CREF's Corporate Governance Program, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STuDY: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: CURRENT AND EMERGING ISsUES, Nov. 12, 1998, at 79, 97-98, 103,
available in Westlaw, SD39 ALI-ABA 79.
118. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (holding that
plaintiffs failed to establish directors' lack of independence where plaintiffs did not
allege that the company's "directors were dominated or otherwise controlled by an
individual or entity interested in the transaction"). See also supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
119. It is not uncommon for members of the corporation's board of directors to
have received stock options. This is especially true of "inside" directors who, in addition
to being members of the board of directors, are also key officers or employees of the
corporation.
120. In nearly every conceivable case, a board would probably reprice all the
employee stock options in a plan or given class of grantees, as opposed to choosing to
reprice only the board members' own stock options. To do the latter would seem to be
an obvious example of self-dealing because the board of directors would be granting to
themselves a benefit in the form of the repricing that is not afforded to others similarly
situated in the corporation. Indeed, if a legitimate reason for the repricing existed, it
would presumably extend to other participants in the plan.
121. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952)
("[W]here the board members vote themselves stock options and do not obtain
stockholder ratification, they themselves have assumed the burden of clearly proving
their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.").
122. This fact may also bolster the argument of plaintiffs who claim there was no
consideration provided to the corporation in exchange for the repricing. See infra notes
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management is responsible for the drop in stock price, then repricing
gives directors a benefit that is disproportionate to that received by other
non-director employees. The other employees presumably performed
their jobs competently and, despite their efforts, still suffered the loss in
the value of their options. Thus, arguably the repricing equitably
restores these employees to their previous position.
The mismanaging directors, however, receive not only this benefit of
restoration, but also the implicit pardon of their failures to competently
perform. The directors in such a situation have bestowed on themselves
greater benefit than that received by other grantees."z This self-granted
"financial pardon," therefore, is an element of self-dealing.2 4  Here,
proving fairness may be difficult for the directors, who may not have a
satisfactory explanation as to why they did not reprice only the others'
options and refrain from repricing their own. If it is found to be unfair,
the transaction may be voidable in accordance with the common law.ln
Directors must make option repricing, like any other decision, mindful
of their fiduciary responsibilities.' However, the business judgment
rule and other formidable obstacles will still stand in the way of any
prospective derivative plaintiff's attempt to establish director liability.'27
These issues are discussed in the following section.
IV. OBSTACLES TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE
A. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule, the standard of review that a court
employs in assessing director conduct,2' is a rebuttable presumption that
183-201 and accompanying text.
123. See Lewis v. Austen, No. C.A.12937, 1999 WL 378125, at *3, *6-8 (Del. Ch.
June 2, 1999) (noting that complaint did not allege that certain features of an option plan
conferred a benefit on directors that was not shared equally by other option holders).
124. This is so because they have put their own interests ahead of the corporation
and other shareholders generally by rewarding their mismanagement with a gift of
repriced options.
125. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
126. These scenarios implicitly assume that the directors, by virtue of their grossly
negligent or conflicted conduct, have been stripped of the protections of the business
judgment rule. In Part IV, this Article focuses on why such scenarios may or may not
leave a board of directors without business judgment rule protection; it will do so from
the perspective of a plaintiff seeking to maintain a stockholder derivative action.
127. Some commentators have expressed the view that derivative actions provide
little, if any, benefit to companies. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991) (arguing that
settlements in derivative actions generally provide minimal compensation and that
primary beneficiaries appear to be lawyers).
128. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE: FIDuCiARY
DuTis OF CORPORATE DIRECTORs 4 (5th ed. 1998).
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corporate business decisions are made in good faith by disinterested and
independent directors who honestly believe that their decision is in the
best interests of the corporation they serve. 29 The business judgment
rule is perhaps the most formidable obstacle facing any derivative
plaintiff.""
One treatise on the subject offers five rationales for such a rule: (1) to
encourage competent managers to serve as directors; (2) to encourage
directors to take business risks; (3) to recognize that directors are better
equipped to make business decisions than courts; (4) to reinforce the
structure that directors, not shareholders, manage the corporation; and
(5) to acknowledge that shareholders' disappointment in management
should be principally addressed by replacing management.13' Whatever
the rationale, the practical effect of the business judgment rule is a
considerable amount of judicial deference to the decisions of boards of
directors.132
The burden falls upon the plaintiff to rebut the business judgment
rule's presumption by alleging facts33 or introducing evidence of such
things as director fraud, self-interest, self-dealing, lack of good faith, or
failure to exercise due care.)' This is no small feat.'35 In Delaware, for
example, a derivative plaintiff36 hoping to survive a motion to dismiss
129. See id. at 4-5; see also Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 59 (Del. 1991); Polk v.
Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). "The
business judgment rule may apply to a deliberate decision not to act, but it has no
bearing on a claim that directors' inaction was the result of ignorance." Rabkin v. Philip
A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. Ch. 1986).
130. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 128, at 4-6.
131. See id. at 12-18.
132. See id. at 21-22.
133. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990).
134. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del.
1989).
135. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff seeking to
overcome the presumption afforded by the business judgment rule has a "heavy burden"
of pleading and proving facts to overcome the presumption. See Lewis v. S.L. & E.,
Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Robert C. Sheehan et al., Mergers
and Acquisitions of Thrifts, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW AND
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIEs: THE THRIFT INDUSTRY IN 1985, Nov. 1, 1985, at
638, available in Westlaw 370 PLI/CoMM. 593 ("The business judgment rule presumes
that directors have acted in good faith absent a showing of fraud, self-dealing or bad
faith, and a heavy burden of proof must be met to overcome the presumption.").
136. A detailed discussion of the procedural standards and hurdles involved in
derivative actions is beyond the scope of this article. For such discussion, see Ferrell,
supra note 98. See also BLOCK Er AL., supra note 128, Chapter IV.
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must allege particularized facts that raise a reasonable doubt that a
majority of the directors are disinterested and independent, or that the
challenged decision was otherwise protected by the business judgment
rule.'37 If the derivative plaintiff follows the general rule and does not go
the "demand futility" route, then he must make demand on the board of
directors to take corrective action. The demand requirement "exists at
the threshold, first to insure that a stockholder exhausts his
intraco orate remedies, and then to provide a safeguard against strike
suits."'3 If the board makes a decision not to his liking (i.e., not to
pursue the complaint), the plaintiff is left in the position of bringing a
wrongful refusal suit, wherein he must allege facts that overcome the
business judgment rule, not with respect to circumstances about which
he originally complained, but with respect to the decision to decline to
pursue the matter further.3 1 This "procedure" under Delaware law
makes it difficult for a derivative plaintiff who cannot successfully
allege facts supporting a finding of demand futility to obtain judicial
review of the substance of his complaint.
The case law presents the problem of option repricing as a subset of
cases concerning executive compensation, which have been analyzed
under the traditional business judgment rule paradigm.' 4  Perhaps
137. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). This discussion presumes that a
plaintiff is alleging demand futility, which is certainly no easy task. In Delaware, a
plaintiff is required to make demand on a corporation's board of directors to redress his
complaint before he resorts to litigation. See DEL. CH. RULE 23.1 (2000). The exception
to this is when the plaintiff can establish that demand is excused or futile because the
board would not fairly consider it. See id.; see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156, 1169 (Del. 1995) ("To be disqualifying, the nature of the director interest
must be substantial."); Noerr v. Greenwood, No. CIV.A.14320, 1997 WL 419633, at "*1,
*9-10 (Del. Ch. July 16, 1997) (holding that, in the context of a motion to dismiss,
plaintiff successfully alleged demand futility with respect to defendants' alleged breach
of their duty of loyalty with respect to two integrated option pricing transactions); Byrne
v. Lord, No. CIV.A.14040, 1995 WL 684868, at *4, *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 1995)
(holding that plaintiff successfully alleged demand futility by alleging that every board
member had a financial interest in option plan that was invalid as a matter of law).
138. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12.
139. See Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in
Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAW. 469, 494-97, 510
(1990); Thomas A. Beck, Levine v. Smith: The Delaware Supreme Court's
Comprehensive Decision on the Demand Requirement, 5 No. 7 INSIGHTS 32, 33 (July
1991). See also Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 74-75 (Del.
1997) (in the context of wrongful refusal case, rejecting defendants' argument that
demand "conclusively" concedes independence), overruled on other grounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
140. See Roger C. Siske & Jacques K. Meguire, Corporate Law and Governance
Issues: Adopting, Amending and Administering Plans, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
COMPENSATION FOR ExEcUTIVES AND BROAD-BASED EMPLOYEE GROUPS: STRATEGY,
DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION, June 4, 1998, at 155, 163, available in Westlaw, SC76
ALI-ABA 155.
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option-repricing cases trigger slightly more judicial scrutiny than other
compensation cases, but it certainly cannot be said that directors making
repricing decisions do not enjoy the presumption of the business
judgment rule. 4'
While cases concerning director decision making, breach of fiduciary
duty and the business judgment rule are abundant, there are only a few
cases framing these issues in the context of option repricing.' The relative
paucity of reported decisions may be some indication of the difficulty of
maintaining such an action. One good example, however, is Michelson
v. Duncan.4 1 In this case, a stockholder brought a derivative action
challenging the grant of stock options by the defendant officers and
directors to certain key employees, including themselves. 44 Specifically,
the plaintiff complained about actions taken by the defendants to modify
an existing stock option plan. 45  One of these actions was the
cancellation of existing options and the issuance of replacement or
exchange options, the exercise price of which was substantially below
[T]o qualify for the protection of the business judgment rule, Delaware courts
require a stock option plan or grant for existing employees to satisfy the
following three-part test in addition to the duties of care and loyalty required
under a traditional business judgment rule analysis:
(i) an identifiable (but not necessarily tangible) benefit must flow to the
corporation;
(ii) the value of the options must be reasonably related to the anticipated
benefit to the corporation; and
(iii) the terms or circumstances of the option grant must be such that the
corporation can reasonably expect to receive the intended benefit.
Id. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1998) (distinguishing between standards of
conduct for directors in § 8.30 and standards of liability for directors in § 8.31).
141. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 99, at 450 ("Judicial interference with
corporate compensation is relatively rare. Cash compensation that is not deferred or
contingent presents the easiest case. Courts look a bit more carefully at percentage
compensation plans and stock options, but the hurdle to obtain judicial intervention is
fairly high."). See also Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 359 (Del. Ch. 1983) ("[Glenerally
directors have the sole authority to determine compensation levels and this determination
is protected by the presumption of the business judgment rule in the absence of a
showing that the business judgment rule does not apply because of a disabling factor.").
142. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding option
repricing approved by interested directors where shareholders ratified repricing and
plaintiff failed to carry burden of proving waste); Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp.
365 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (repricing disallowed in dispute over whether shareholder approval
of amendment to option plan was properly obtained); Goldsholl v. Shapiro, 417 F. Supp.
1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (repricing disallowed where repricing approved by interested
directors without shareholder ratification).
143. 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
144. See id. at 214-15.
145. See id. at 214.
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that of the old options. 4 6 The ostensible purpose of this modification
was predictably to "restore [the] incentive to exercise the options" that
was lost "following a dramatic decline in the market price" of the
company's stock.'47
The plaintiff attacked the issuance of the exchange options, claiming
that the board lacked authority to issue the exchange options and that the
exchange options constituted a waste or gift of corporate assets.'
Plaintiff's waste allegations accused the board of lowering the options'
exercise prices, accelerating their exercise rates, and granting new
options "with no parity of services rendered to [the] value of [the]
options granted."'49 The court considered these arguments in the context
of cross-motions for summary judgment.50
With respect to the first argument of lack of authority, the court found
that a non-unanimous shareholder ratification of the amended plan had
occurred that cured any problem of lack of board authority.'5' However,
plaintiff's other argument fared better. The Michelson court concluded
that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a claim that the exchange
options constituted a waste or gift of corporate assets and that there was
sufficient evidence in the record to raise a triable issue of fact with
respect to that claim.5
If nothing else, this case demonstrates that option repricing may fit
rather neatly within the conventional lexicon concerning challenges to
director action. Not all those opposed to option repricing, however, have
had such success.'53 Moreover, in general, a substantial number of the
146. See id. at 215.
147. Id.
148. See id. With respect to the second point, a significant portion of the court's
opinion is devoted to concluding that the plaintiff did allege a gift or waste of corporate
assets, did not waive such claim, and created a material issue of fact with respect to it.
Having lost on the authority point, without a claim of gift or waste, the plaintiff would
not have been able to successfully defend defendants' motion for summary judgment.
See id. at 216-23.
149. Id. at 223. The acceleration of exercise rates referred to the fact that the
original plan provided that options could be exercised at a maximum rate of 10% per
year and the amended plan increased this limit to 33.3%. See id. at 215.
150. See id. at 215-16.
151. See id. at 219-20. Presumably, this shareholder ratification also "cleansed" the
transaction of any taint of conflict of interest. See infra notes 158-74 and accompanying
text. However, only unanimous shareholder approval can sanitize a waste transaction.
See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 99, at 439.
152. See Michelson, 407 A.2d at 223.
153. See, e.g., Criden v. Steinberg, No. 17082, 2000 WL 354390, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 23, 2000) (granting motion to dismiss where defendants failed to allege waste or
breach of fiduciary duty in context of option repricing); Hoffman v. Dann, 205 A.2d 343
(Del. 1964). In Hoffinan, a court was approving the settlement of a stockholder
derivative action and an objecting stockholder believed that a claim of improper option
repricing was meritorious and had the probability of substantial recovery. See id. at 349.
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cases concerning stock options have been terminated in favor of the
defendants at early stages in the litigation.'-4 Indeed, assuming that the
ultimate decision-makers are independent and the decision is made by
them with the requisite care in accordance with the plan, and also
assuming that the corporation receives adequate consideration for the
option repricing,1 5 then the decision is virtually unassailable because of
the business judgment rule.
56
The business judgment rule is not, however, the only thing that stands
in a plaintiffs way. In fact, certain statutory provisions also reinforce
the protections of the business judgment rule. 57 For example, as
discussed above, a plaintiff may attempt to rebut the business judgment
rule by alleging that the directors were conflicted in their decision-
making. Upon first consideration, one might think this provides a
plaintiff with considerable opportunity to rebut the business judgment
rule in the context of option repricing that benefits directors. This is not
the case, however, primarily due to the effect of statutes like Delaware
In concluding that this cause of action had no merit, the court opined:
The argument of [the objector] seems to be that a corporation should not
permit the cancellation of old options and the issuance of new stock options at
lower prices since that, in effect, excuses poor performance by management.
Certain magazine and Law Review articles are cited to this effect and, indeed,
we may assume that, as an ordinary business practice, such action is
undesirable. This does not alter the fact, however, that under the law of this
State a Stock Option Plan may not be successfully attacked when the options
are granted by a disinterested committee with the approval of the directors and
stockholders, and where the optionee is required to remain in the employ of the
corporation. The new Option Plan meets these tests.
Id. (citation omitted).
154. See, e.g., Lewis v. Austen, No. C.A. 12937, 1999 WL 378125, at *3, ::"6-8
(Del. Ch. June 2, 1999) (finding that plaintiff failed in his attempts to allege demand
futility, waste of corporate assets, and breach of fiduciary duty concerning certain option
plans); Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch. 1997) (finding that, in challenging a
grant of options to company's chief executive officer, plaintiff failed to allege futility
and waste of corporate assets).
155. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
156. The same can be said for all conflicting interest transactions, including those
involving executive compensation, where the conflict is cleansed. See infra notes 158-
74 and accompanying text.
157. For an analysis of how the business judgment rule operates in the executive
compensation arena, see R. Franklin Balotti et al., The Business Judgment Rule in
Delaware: Corporate Control Contests and Executive Compensation, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: DELAWARE LAW
FOR CORPORATE LAWYERS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, Apr. 29, 1985, at 95, available in
Westlaw, 483 PLI/CoRP. 95.
1145
General Corporation Law section 144.'
B. Delaware's Section 144
At common law, the participation, or even presence, of conflicted
directors provided a basis for voiding a transaction.' In a modem
corporate environment, however, the common law rule threatened to
disrupt an unacceptably high number of corporate decisions. ° As a
result, many jurisdictions have enacted statutes reversing the common
law rule under certain circumstances. 6' These statutes provide a
mechanism for cleansing these transactions by a vote of disinterested
directors or shareholders. 62 These statutes also permit the board of
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
159. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) (observing that under
common law, stockholders had the "power to nullify an interested [director]
transaction"). See also R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A
Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 Bus. LAw. 965, 983
(1999) ("At common law, transactions between a corporation and a director (or between
a corporation and another entity in which the director had a significant personal interest)
were originally void per se and, later, voidable."); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 454 (1993) (at common law, "self-interested transactions [were]
voidable without regard to fairness").
160. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 99, at 403 ("As the complexity and
interconnection of American business increased, conflicting interest transactions became
an accepted business reality. Judicial views evolved accordingly.").
161. See Daniel S. Evans, Use of Special Committees in Extraordinary
Transactions, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES: HANDLING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN HIGH-TECH AND EMERGING
GRoWTH ENVIRONMENTS, Apr.-June 1998, at 889, 893, available in Westlaw, 1044
PLI/CORP. 889 ("[M]ost (if not all) corporation statutes provide that a transaction in
which one or more directors are interested will not be void or voidable solely for the self-
interest if it is approved by a majority of disinterested directors (even if not a quorum), if
it is approved by the stockholders, or if it is fair to the corporation."). Cf MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63 (1998).
Earlier statutes left entirely to judicial interpretation-and to the guess of
corporate counsel-the central question as to what does and what does not
constitute a conflicting interest of a director. Great uncertainty has arisen as to
the scope of that concept. Subchapter F takes the new step of spelling out a
practical working definition of "conflicting interest" and declares that
definition to be exclusive. Circumstances that fall outside the statutory
definition of conflicting interest cannot constitute the basis for an attack on a
transaction on grounds of a director's interest conflict, although they may, of
course, afford basis for legal attack on some other ground. Finally, to a greater
degree than its predecessors, the subchapter specifies when judicial
intervention is appropriate and when it is not.
Id. at 8-98 (Introductory Comment to Subchapter F). Cf PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOV. §
5.02 (ALI 1992). "For clarity of analysis, Part V avoids the use of the term 'duty of
loyalty,' when dealing with the obligations of a person who acts with a pecuniary interest
in a matter, and instead uses the term 'duty of fair dealing."' Id. (Introductory Note to
Part V).
162. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del. 1993).
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directors to defend an "uncleansed" conflict of interest transaction by
proving that the transaction was fair to the corporation.6 3
Delaware's reversal of the common law rule is codified in Delaware
General Corporation Law section 144.'6 In pertinent part, Section 144
provides:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its
directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation,
partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors
or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or
voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which
authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because his or their votes are
counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the
committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or
transaction by the affirnative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors,
even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote
thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by
vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it
is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the
shareholders.
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a committee
which authorizes the contract or transaction.165
In order for the cleansing provided for in Section 144 to be effective,
the directors must disclose to the disinterested directors or shareholders
"[t]he material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the
contract or transaction."' 66  If the approval of shareholders is being
163. See id. In this context, the notion of what is "fair" to the corporation
encompasses a showing both of "fair dealing" with the corporation and that the
transaction was consummated at a "fair price." See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d,
701, 711 (Del. 1983). In this regard, "fair dealing" involves "questions of when the
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained."
Id. The fair price inquiry "relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed merger." Id.
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
165. Id. For a discussion of section 144 and the corresponding Florida statute, see
Gardner Davis, Director Conflicts of Interest Under the Florida Business Corporation
Act: Hidden Shoals in a Safe Harbor, 72 FLA. B.J. 31, 31-32 (1998).
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144. "A director is considered interested where he or
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sought, the directors of a public company would typically make such
disclosure via a proxy statement. 67 The proxy rules promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission require fairly extensive disclosure
of repricing transactions.' 6' Hence, a failure to make adequate disclosure
with respect to a repricing transaction not only may deprive directors of
the benefit of section 144, but also may be an independent breach of
fiduciary duty as well as a violation of the federal securities laws.6' In
any event, the failure to make adequate disclosure provides a
shareholder with another basis for attacking the repricing. 70
she will receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that is not equally shared
by the stockholders." Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993).
167. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that a shareholder vote to validate an
interested director transaction requires that the approval must come from a majority of
disinterested shareholders. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22 (Del. 1976).
168. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(i) (1999). The Securities Exchange Commission's
proxy disclosure rules require, among other things, disclosure of the option repricing of
all of the company's officers and directors for a 10-year period, including an explanation
of the basis for each repricing that has occurred. See also supra notes 71, 166-67 and
accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1980). In Galef, the
shareholder of an Ohio corporation alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and proxy
statement violations (of the federal securities laws) in connection with the issuance of
exchange options (with lower exercise prices than the options they replaced) that
benefited certain officer-directors. Id. at 54-55. With respect to the proxy violations, the
court said:
The role of management in educating the stockholder sufficiently to allow him
to cast an intelligent vote is unique. Those managing the corporation have the
greatest access to relevant factual information. They have most clearly in
mind the corporation's long-range plans. These factors and the directors'
status as fiduciaries usually cause stockholders to give statements from
management greater weight than they accord to the statements of corporate
dissidents. Obviously the goal of § 14(a) that communications from
management be accurate and complete as to all material facts is a vital one. Its
achievement would quite clearly be frustrated if a director who was made a
defendant in a derivative action for providing inadequate information in
connection with a proxy solicitation were permitted to cause the dismissal of
that action simply on the basis of his judgment that its pursuit was not in the
best interests of the corporation. The very premises which give life to a
derivative right of action to enforce § 14(a) must save it from a premature
death. In short, we conclude that to the extent that a complaint states claims
against directors under § 14(a) upon which relief may be granted, federal
policy prevents the summary dismissal of those claims pursuant to the business
judgment of those defendant directors.
Id. at 63-64.
170. See, e.g., In re 3Com Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL
1009210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) (finding that plaintiff attacked option plan but failed to
allege breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and waste where directors received stock
options pursuant to a plan that had received shareholder approval, and that plaintiff also
failed to allege proxy disclosure violations where proxy soliciting shareholder approval
of plan amendment disclosed neither option value as calculated under the Black-Scholes
Option Pricing Model, nor the possibility that the directors could "short" their options
immediately).
1148
[VOL. 37: 1117, 2000] Challenging Option Repricing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Another effect of section 144' on the area of executive compensation
has been that corporations are likely to establish compensation
committees composed of "disinterested and independent" directors. 2
These committees often engage the services of a compensation
consultant who may be called upon to assess the "fairness" of a
compensation package.' In so doing, the compensation consultant
assists directors, not just in avoiding conflict, but also in meeting their
duty of care, a concern which remains even in the absence of conflict.
Prophylactic measures such as these have been in large part successful in
insulating compensation decisions, including these involving stock
options, from attack."
In summary, compliance with section 144 provides considerable
insulation of an option repricing transaction against derivative attack.
C. Delaware's Section 157
Delaware law presents another statutory hurdle for those seeking to
challenge option repricing. 75  In pertinent part, section 157 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, entitled "Rights and Options
Respecting Stock," provides:
171. Neither section 144 nor its case law govern controlling-shareholder
transactions with a company; those must be reviewed under a fairness standard. See
Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L.
27, 39-41 (1999).
172. See COMMITrEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GuIDEnOOK 1268-69 (2d ed. 1994).
173. See Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and
Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1881 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN
SEARCH OF ExcEss (1991)).
A compensation committee sympathetic to and predisposed to be "fair" with
the CEO, which then hears a presentation by the compensation consultant as to
how the CEO's compensation is "below average" and why additional
"motivational" compensation is needed, is very likely to vote for such
additional compensation. This is particularly true when, as is usually the case,
there is no one, either on the board or advising the board, who has any duty or
inclination to argue against an increased compensation package.
Id.
174. See Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and
Agency Costs, 35 Hous. L. REv. 399, 418 (1998) ("[Bloards typically insulate
themselves from claims of negligence by relying on the conclusions of independent
compensation committees and outside compensation consultants."); Charles M. Elson,
Executive Overcompensation: A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REv. 937, 978-79
(1993) ("The retention of an independent compensation consultant insulates both the
compensation committee and the full board from liability.").
175. DEL. CoDEANN. tt. 8, § 157 (1991).
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Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every
corporation may create and issue, whether or not in connection with the issue
and sale of any shares of stock or other securities of the corporation, rights or
options entitling the holders thereof to purchase from the corporation any shares
of its capital stock of any class or classes, such rights or options to be evidenced
by or in such instrument or instruments as shall be approved by the board of
directors.
The terms upon which, including the time or times which may be limited or
unlimited in duration, at or within which, and the price or prices at which any
such shares may be purchased from the corporation upon the exercise of any
such right or option, shall be such as shall be stated in the certificate of
incorporation, or in a resolution adopted by the board of directors providing for
the creation and issue of such rights or options, and, in every case, shall be set
forth or incorporated by reference in the instrument or instruments evidencing
such rights or options. In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rightsor options and the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive. 76
On its face, section 157 appears to impose no greater duty on directors
in assessing whether the corporation has received adequate consideration
for the grant of options than that of avoiding actual fraud.' However,
all else is not necessarily lost for prospective plaintiffs. First, it is
unclear whether interested directors (i.e., directors suffering from a
conflict of interest) get the benefit of the presumption in this statute.'
Moreover, notwithstanding section 157's broad coverage, courts have
held that it does not foreclose actions for waste (i.e., where the
corporation receives none or grossly inadequate consideration for the
issuance of stock options).'79
Despite this, section 157 spells doom for a considerable number of
option repricing challenges, as the only openings will be for cases of
actual fraud, egregious cases of outright waste, and perhaps those
176. Id. (emphasis added). The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that section
157 is not limited to the issuance of options for the purpose of corporate financing. See
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc. 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985).
177. Other jurisdictions have enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-6407 (1998); OKLA. STAT. tit 18, § 1038 (2000). Cf MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.24
(1998) ("A corporation may issue rights, options, or warrants for the purchase of shares
of the corporation. The board of directors shall determine the terms upon which the
rights, options, or warrants are issued, their form and content, and the consideration for
which the shares are to be issued.").
178. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625-27 (Del. 1984) (stating that whether
conflicted directors get the benefit of the irrebutable presumption in section 157 is an
open question under Delaware law), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). Even if section 157 were held not to apply to conflicted directors,
it seems logical to presume that conflicted directors who availed themselves of section
144 might nonetheless have the protection of section 157 restored.
179. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979) ("We do not read §
157 as intended to erect a legal barrier to any claim for relief as to an alleged gift or
waste of corporate assets in the issuance of stock options where the claim asserted is one
of absolute failure of consideration.").
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involving uncleansed conflicts of interest.'80 As discussed above, waste
cases are fairly forgiving in assessing director decision making,
especially in light of Delaware's willingness to find intangible forms of
consideration."'
The business judgment rule and statutes like section 144 and section
157 combine to make a derivative plaintiff's task difficult, but not
impossible."2 In addition to these legal obstacles, however, plaintiff
may also have special problems of proof associated with his allegations
of waste and self-dealing.
D. The Difficulty in Proving Waste and Self-Dealing
As discussed above, plaintiffs case is strengthened by allegations that
183the directors are responsible for the decline in stock price. If
management is responsible for the drop in stock price, then repricing
gives directors a benefit that is disproportionate to that received by
others through the repricing.' 4 In such a case, management is arguably
rewarding its own incompetence through essentially a gift of lower
priced options."5
Proof that mismanagement brought about the drop in the stock price
will enhance a plaintiff's chances of prevailing on both theories of self-
dealing and waste. Such would underscore the conflict of interest
present in the directors' decision to reprice and introduce a strong
180. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. It may also be that section 157
will not insulate directors who breach their procedural duty of care (i.e., where directors
are grossly negligent in informing themselves with respect to the repricing). See supra
notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
182. In addition, the procedural hurdles in derivative litigation may also present
considerable challenges to plaintiffs. See generally Ferrell, supra note 98. For example,
in Delaware, the pleading burden is quite high where the plaintiff seeks to establish
demand futility, especially in light of the fact that the plaintiff must make his allegations
without the benefit of discovery. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. See
also infra note 220 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
184. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (declaring no
self-dealing where parent company caused subsidiary to declare dividend but received
nothing to the exclusion of subsidiary's minority stockholders; business judgment rule
standard applied in assessing propriety of parent's conduct); see also supra notes 122-25
and accompanying text.
185. See Stone, supra note 44. One commentator has suggested that repricing a
CEO's options is appropriate where the stock's decline is not the "CEO's fault and
where the repricing creates no expectation of further repricings." Yablon, supra note 41,
at 298.
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element of self-dealing to the conflicting interest transaction.'86 It would
also strengthen a waste theory by arguably showing that, in light of
management's track record, there is no consideration for the repricing.
However, even if the plaintiff can establish questionable or even horrible
decision-making by management, the plaintiff still has the problem of
demonstrating the causal link to the drop in stock price.'87
A legitimate criticism of some employee stock option plans is that
they do not give consideration to the empirical evidence that executives
have only limited influence over stock price."'8 While this fact may
provide a legitimate basis for criticism of the stock plan at inception, it
also makes a derivative plaintiff's repricing challenge difficult.
This is not unlike the problem confronted by a plaintiff bringing a
securities fraud case under rule lOb-5.'89 In such cases, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant's fraud caused the artificial inflation or
suppression of the stock price and link the fraud to changes in stock
price.9' Similarly, a plaintiff complaining of repricing in the face of
gross mismanagement should identify the dates of "poor management
events" and the corresponding drop in stock price,'' and eliminate non-
186. See supra notes 122-25, 183-85 and accompanying text.
187. Cf., e.g., Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that plaintiff in section lOb-5 case "must establish that the misstatement caused him to
incur the loss of which he complains," and that Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act
of 1933 allow the defendant to reduce award by showing that misstatement did not cause
decline in stock's value); Ziemack v. Centel Corp., 856 F. Supp. 430, 433-34 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (finding that class representatives adequately stated claim for relief where
allegations were made that stock was artificially inflated due to misstatements and that
when market learned of truth, market corrected for alleged artificial inflation of stock
price).
188. See supra note 48. Cf. Robert A. Haugen et al., The Effect of Volatility
Changes on the Level of Stock Prices and Subsequent Expected Returns, 46 J. FIN. 985,
1006 (1991) (suggesting that stock price volatility is related to investors' emotions or
intuitions, as opposed to "real economic events").
189. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). The elements of a section lOb-5 claim under
the federal securities laws are: "(1) a misstatement or omission (2) of material fact (3)
occurring in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, that (4) was made with
scienter and (5) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied, (6) and that proximately
caused injury to the plaintiff." Trust Co. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1488 (5th Cir.
1997).
190. See, e.g., Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996)
(affirming jury instruction that loss causation could be found if misrepresentations or
omissions caused market price of stock purchased by class members to be higher than it
would have been if true facts were known); Endo v. Albertine, 863 F. Supp. 708, 723
(N.D. IIl. 1994) (finding that plaintiff in securities case must show that alleged fraud, as
opposed to general industry factors, caused plaintiff's loss). Cf. In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,
829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that event study is necessary to
isolate influence of information specific to company which defendants allegedly
distorted).
191. While the precise formulation of such an "event study" is beyond the scope of
this Article and would require the assistance of an economist, statistician, or financial
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management related factors that led to the stock's decline.' 9 In this
regard, the plaintiff may be assisted by expert testimony.'9 However,
whether any expert's techniques in this regard are sufficiently reliable to
be entertained by a court of law is subject to question.' 9'
Furthermore, the defendant directors may argue that it is inappropriate
for a plaintiff to link a series of business decisions together. This would
essentially deprive them of business judgment rule protection in the
context of the repricing decision. The director may assert that each
transaction to which plaintiff attributes a drop in stock price should be
evaluated on its own merits. In other words, defendants might assert
that business judgment rule protection must be assessed on a transaction-
by-transaction basis.95
theorist, the study should attempt to determine if there is a correlation between bad
management decisions and declines in stock price. In doing so, it is important to
remember that the stock price may not precipitously drop immediately following the
event. Instead, the stock price may drift downward for some ensuing period as the
market digests the information. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(finding that damages in securities class actions are the difference between price paid or
received for stock and mean trading price of security during 90-day period following
revelation of the truth).
192. Cf. In re Executive Telecard, Ltd., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1025-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (rejecting expert testimony in securities fraud case due to expert's failure to isolate
movement in stock price likely attributable to alleged fraud from movement reasonably
attributable to other factors, and finding that defects in expert's work included his failure
to incorporate an events study into his damage analysis, to consider how company-
specific events affected decline in company's stock price, and to make a comparison of
movement of company's stock to an appropriate composite index).
193. See supra notes 190-92 and infra note 194. If an expert does not make some
effort to isolate the negative effect of management's performance on the market price of
the stock, his opinion will be vulnerable to attack by defendants who will be able to
demonstrate, through expert testimony and otherwise, that stock prices fluctuate for a
variety of reasons. Hence, defendants will attempt to prove that the decline in stock
price is related to factors other than management's performance. For example,
defendants might point to the performance of other similarly situated companies in an
effort to show that the stock price decline was the result of something as innocuous as
the company's sector being out of favor. Cf. Executive Telecard, 979 F. Supp. at 1027-
28 (rejecting use by expert witness of Telecom Index, as opposed to "small cap" index,
because latter index would have more reliably factored in market risk on company's
stock price and on damages sustained by class).
194. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (stating that
Daubert gatekeeping obligation applies to all experts' testimony); Daubert v. Merrell-
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (stating that Federal Rule of Evidence 702
requires trial court to ensure that scientific testimony is both relevant and reliable). See
generally Karen A. Reardon & Scott 0. Reed, Commentary, A Critical Examination of
Plaintiffs' Experts' Damage Analysis: An Important Defense Tactic After Daubert and
Kumho, 5 No. 10 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 11 (2000).
195. See Criden v. Steinberg, No. 17082, 2000 WL 354390, at -"2 (Del. Ch. Mar.
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In fact, defendants might point out that the business judgment rule
protects even decision-making that seems poor with the benefit of
hindsight.'96 If plaintiff is permitted to aggregate these transactions, then
a fundamental policy of the business judgment rule will be seriously
eroded. Plaintiffs who believe that management is "underperforming"
over a period of time should not be filing derivative claims, but instead
should be voting at shareholders' meetings to replace the board of
directors.'97
This argument, however, overlooks the element of self-dealing and
waste identified above. Plaintiff's purpose in demonstrating defendant's
incompetence over a period of time is not to strip those transactions of
business judgment rule protection, but instead, to demonstrate the
impropriety of the directors' repricing of their own options. The
historical context of the poor decisions and their negative effect on the
stock price reveals both the waste associated with repricing the
defendant's options and the self-dealing of awarding themselves an
inappropriate and disproportionate benefit. 98  It also reveals the
directors' possible breach of the procedural duty of care in approving the
repricing without considering management's poor track record.'
Plaintiff might even go so far as to concede arguendo that the business
judgment rule applies to each of the poor decisions preceding the
repricing, while at the same time maintaining that the business judgment
rule does not justify protection for a decision to reward a series of bad
performances.
Such an argument might also be used by a plaintiff in the context of
"independent and disinterested" directors who decide to reprice another
director's options. Here, disregarding concerns about structural bias
discussed below,"°' the element of self-dealing is not present. 20 The
23, 2000). Cf. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. CIV.A.13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *2, *9
(Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (reviewing demand futility on transaction-by-transaction basis).
But see Noerr v. Greenwood, No. CIV.A.14320, 1997 WL 419633, at *1, *9 (Del. Ch.
July 16, 1997) (finding plaintiffs successfully alleged that the approval by directors of
two stock options plans were a single, unified transaction that provided benefits to the
entire board); Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., No. CIV.A.7956, 1990 WL 154149, at *3
(Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1990) (treating multiple acts as single transaction in context of
determining whether demand was excused).
196. See Mary Siegel, Tender Offer Defense Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 377, 380 (1985) (arguing that business judgment rule protects directors
from liability for "decisions that, although properly made, produce poor results"). See
also Bogart, supra note 103, at 746.
197. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 128, at 18. See also supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 203-20 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff, however, may still make a convincing argument of breach of
the procedural or substantive duty of care. Plaintiff may be able to
establish that these directors did not adequately consider the "track
record" of the director who is to benefit from the repricing.
Alternatively, plaintiff may assert that the repricing constitutes waste in
light of the directors' "track record."
E. The Problem of Structural Bias
The problem of structural bias must also be examined in the context of
option repricing."3 Structural bias is a group phenomenon associated
with the fact that directors share much in common and that even if those
making a given decision appear to be disinterested and independent, or
even are so under current law, they are not in reality free from influence
because of their inherent empathies and sympathies toward one
another.0 4 An example of the effect of such criticism on the law can be
seen in the tests employed by courts to evaluate the reports of special
litigation committees."' Some courts refuse to give any special
202. This assumes not only a lack of conflict of interest on the part of the repricing
directors, but also that they are not controlled or dominated by the directors who will
benefit from the repricing. See supra notes 72, 118 and accompanying text.
203. See William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They
Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus. LAW. 2055, 2059 (1990).
204. See James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the AL! Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962, 1008. As
one commentator observed:
Even if the independent directors are not actually biased in favor of the
insiders, the former often are predisposed to favor the latter. Most of the
learning on this phenomenon, known as structural bias, arises out of the use of
special litigation committees to terminate shareholder derivative litigation
against officers or directors. Independent directors tend to be corporate
officers or retirees who share the same views and values as the insiders. A
sense of "there but for the grace of God go I' is the likely response to litigation
against fellow directors.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1059-60 (1993) (citations omitted). See also
Alexander G. Simpson, Note, Shareholder Voting and the Chicago School: Now Is the
Winter of Our Discontent, 43 DuKE L.J. 189, 209 (1993) ("Certain inherent structural
biases in the relationship between management and the board of directors militate in
favor of increased shareholder oversight of the executive compensation decision.").
205. Special litigation committees are those empowered by a board of directors to
assess whether a pending derivative action should continue. See Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-89 (Del. 1981). If such a committee decides that it
should not, the corporation moves to dismiss the action on the basis of the committee's
report. See id. at 788.
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deference to the reports of these committees, despite the fact that their
members are ostensibly "disinterested" and "independent." Even
Delaware, often criticized as being pro-management, does not give the
traditional business judgment rule deference to such reports. 2W
If credence is given to structural bias,08 the option repricing problem
is further complicated. Structural bias may lead to repricing decisions
that are not necessarily in the best interests of the corporation,2' but
instead are empathetic (albeit perhaps subconscious) responses to a
"fellow" director.210  Such decision making may also include some
strategic thinking by the deciding director, who may realize that
compensation, bonus, or benefit questions concerning him will
inevitably arise and his fate will then be in the hands of those whose fate
he is currently deciding. 1 In this sense, the decision becomes an
206. One court held that the directors whose conduct is in question cannot choose
the members of the special litigation committee. See Miller v. Register & Tribune
Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716-18 (Iowa 1983).
207. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89.
The Court should apply a two-step test to the motion.
First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.... The corporation
should have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a reasonable
investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith and
reasonableness.... If... the Court is satisfied... that the committee was
independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith findings and
recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its discretion, to the next step.
The second step provides, we believe, the essential key in striking the
balance between legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a derivative
stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as expressed by an
independent investigating committee. The Court should determine, applying
its own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted.
Id.
208. See Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the
Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 315, 397 (1987) (stating that even
proponents of structural bias theory must acknowledge that independent/outside directors
are a "better safeguard of the shareholders' interests than are directors who are not
independent"). But see Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1282-83 (1982) (because independent directors may lack expertise
or familiarity with company's affairs, they may rubber stamp management's decisions
and thus not function as an effective curb on management's discretion).
209. Indeed, where a company's directors are also managers, they are "dependent
on superior officers for promotion and retention." Franklin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents
the Corporation? In Search of a Better Method for Determining the Corporate Interest
in Derivative Suits, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 265, 278 (1985).
210. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
211. Cf. Noerr v. Greenwood, No. CIV.A.14320, 1997 WL 419633, at *1, *9-10
(Del. Ch. July 16, 1997). In Noerr, the court stated:
In these circumstances, the complaint can fairly be read to allege that both
Plans were part of a unified scheme to provide all board members with
incentive options. Therefore, the vote approving the two plans should not be
"separated" to enable the defendants to avoid the conclusion of demand
futility. Were the Court to hold otherwise, a board of directors could confer
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indirect or attenuated quid pro quo.1 2 No conscious agreement is
necessary. 3  It might simply be a tacit understanding born out of a
common position, experience, and expectations.2 4
The structural bias argument also suggests that commonly employed
procedures, such as "disinterested and independent" director or
committee approval, do not "cleanse" the repricing decision in a
meaningful sense.2 5 Problems of structural bias might emerge even with
"disinterested" shareholder approval, depending on the relationship of
the shareholders to the directors.1 6
Despite the legitimate observations regarding human behavior
upon itself any degree of benefit it desired, yet escape scrutiny by creating a
separate plan for each director and then by having all directors other than the
benefitting director vote to approve each plan.
Nor is there merit in the defendants' argument that the Court cannot infer
that the four directors who benefitted under the Director Plan, and the one
director who benefitted under the Employee Plan, would improperly influence
one another in reviewing the plaintiff's challenges to the separate plans. The
argument misses the point, for the issue is not whether those defendants would
improperly influence each other. Rather, the issue is whether those directors
could disinterestedly assess the challenge to the individual Plan under which
they did not benefit. Because the particularized factual allegations in the
complaint permit the inference that the Plans were adopted as a single
transaction, those allegations create a reason to doubt that they could. For that
reason, demand is excused.
Id. See also supra note 209 and accompanying text.
212. The implications of game theory may also be significant. In this regard, the
director may think that if she votes for the repricing, she is more likely to receive
favorable treatment when the subject of her own compensation (or option repricing) is
addressed by those persons whose repriced options she approved. For an interesting
discussion of game theory, see Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of
Competition, 60 U. IN. L. REv. 285 (1991).
213. This is not to say that there would not be isolated instances where a conscious
agreement is reached.
214. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
215. See George W. Dent, Jr., A Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96, 113 (1980)
(suggesting that pressures to conform discourage director independence); Mark A.
Underberg, Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REv. 600, 601 n.14 (1980) ("'Structural bias' is inherent prejudice against
any derivative action resulting from the composition and character of the board of
directors."); Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of
Directors, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1894, 1901 (1983) ("Given cohesiveness and informational
dependence in the boardroom, directors are likely to conform to the expectations both of
management and of their fellow board members.").
216. In some companies, large shareholders have long-standing relationships with
the company's officers and directors. Under such circumstances, these large
shareholders may have some allegiance to management when they vote on corporate
matters.
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incorporated into the structural bias analysis,217 the effect of structural
bias is one that is difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate in the context of
litigation.1 8 Indeed, the condensed and adversarial nature of litigation
and the law defining "disinterested and independent" often make proof
of such subtleties extremely difficult, if not impossible.219 Moreover, in
a jurisdiction such as Delaware, a plaintiff must make his allegations in
large part without the benefit of discovery. °
As the above discussion demonstrates, a derivative plaintiff has an
uphill battle in an option repricing case. Hence, consideration of
alternatives to litigation to deal with the issue of repricing is warranted.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO DERiVATIVE LITIGATION
While the above discussion does not entirely foreclose shareholder
derivative actions as an avenue of redress for questionable decisions to
reprice, it nonetheless realistically portrays such litigation as difficult.
Thus, it is not surprising that institutional shareholders' have sought to
217. For a thorough discussion of the structural bias phenomenon, see James D.
Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal hnplications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85 (1985).
218. However, some courts have recognized this problem when confronted with it.
See, e.g., Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa
1983) ("We believe that the potential for structural bias on the part of a litigation
committee appointed by directors who are parties to derivative actions is sufficiently
great and sufficiently difficult of precise proof in an individual case to require the
adoption of a prophylactic rule.").
219. Additionally, outside the litigation context, shareholders rely in large part on
management for information concerning the company and the matters on which they are
called upon to vote. Title 8, section 144(a)(2) of the Delaware Code provides that
shareholder approval is effective only if "[t]he material facts as to the [conflicted]
director's or officer's relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are
disclosed or are known to the shareholders .... DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2)
(1991). The information is within the knowledge and under the control of the directors
who make the judgment as to what to disclose. See supra notes 158-74 and
accompanying text. In so doing, however, they must consider the demands of fiduciary
duty and section 144, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC")
recent pronouncements on repricing disclosure. The SEC regulates such disclosure
through its proxy rules. See, e.g., Director's Alert, SEC Slams Option Repricers with
New Ruling (Jan. 1999) <http:lwww.directorsalert.com/9901/990101.htm> (reporting
that the SEC no longer considers option repricing an ordinary business decision). The
reason for this is that, as a practical matter, due to the widespread ownership of public
companies, they can only effectively and reliably communicate with shareholders
through the proxy process. See also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
220. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208-10 (Del. 1991) (finding that derivative
plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery to assist compliance with Rule 23.1), overruled
on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
221. An institutional investor is an "organization that trades large volumes of
securities. Some examples are mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, pension
funds, labor union funds, corporate profit-sharing plans, and college endowment funds."
See BARRON'S, supra note 2, at 371.
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fight the option repricing battle primarily on other fronts.'m
Institutional shareholders have issued policy statements generally
against repricing and have actively lobbied some boards to refrain from
option repricing.22 Through these efforts, some of these shareholders
have succeeded in convincing companies to voluntarily change their
policies regarding repricing 2 4 In 1998, the State of Wisconsin
Investment Board sponsored a shareholder resolution to require
shareholder approval for option repricing at Cardio Thoracic Systems.22
The proposal received a substantial amount of support*26 Where such
change has not been undertaken voluntarily, at least one institutional
shareholder has made a shareholder proposal to amend a company's
bylaws to require management to seek the approval of the stockholders
before any repricing can take place?27
In this instance, management brought litigation to bar the proposal.'
One interesting legal question presented in the context of this battle was
whether shareholders may mandate such a course of action. In opposing
the institutional investor's actions, management asserted that any such
amendment to the company's bylaws would be void as an impermissible
infringement on the board's authority to manage the corporation under
222. See, e.g., Richard H. Koppes, Corporate Governance, NAT'LL.J., July 6, 1998,
at B6 (reporting in connection with the 1998 proxy season that "[iln most cases, the
increasing power of pension funds and other institutional investors has made
management more willing to listen to the complaints of company shareholders. One
factor is the fundamental shift over the last decade in the power dynamics of
shareholders and corporations."). See also supra note 242 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., SWIB Urges Auspex Shareholders to Reject Excessive Option
Dilution and Option Repricing (visited Sept. 29, 2000) <http://badger.state.wi.us/
agencies/invbdlhtml/auspex.html> (reporting that the State of Wisconsin Investment
Board asked 22 companies to adopt a policy requiring shareholder approval of
repricing).
224. See Roberta D. Fox, Technical Developments in Executive Compensation,
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: COMPENSATION FOR ExEcuTrvES AND BROAD-BASED
EMPLOYEE GROUPS, June 10, 1999, at 33, 95, available in Westlaw, SD82 ALI-ABA 33
(reporting that just under 75% of the companies approached by the State of Wisconsin
Investment Board took voluntary actions regarding option repricing); Keith L. Johnson,
Wisconsin's Investor Responsibility Program, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CORPORATE
GOvERNANCE INSTITUTE, Oct. 7, 1999, at 1, 3, available in Westlaw, SE 39 ALI-ABA 1.
225. See Zanglein, supra note 46, at 83-84.
226. See id.
227. See General Datacomm Indus., Inc. v. Wisconsin Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818 (Del.
Ch. 1999). For a discussion of shareholder approval of stock of option plans, see
Thomas & Martin, supra note 27, at 46-5 1.
228. See General Datacomm, 731 A.2d at 818-20.
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Delaware law.229 If such a bylaw provision were held to violate this
statute, then to accomplish their objectives shareholders would have to
effect an amendment to the certificate or articles of incorporation, which
is not an easy task because under Delaware law the board of directors
must initiate amendments to the articles of incorporation.2no Despite this
argument, the court refused to declare whether the bylaw was invalide
and allowed the proposal to be presented to the shareholders who
approved it.
2
The success of institutional shareholders' efforts to curb option
repricing is less a statement of the strength of any legal position of
institutional shareholders than it is an illustration of their economic
muscle-the fact that management must be sensitive to their threat of
withdrawing their substantial investments.23 Such withdrawal would
cause not only public relations issues, but perhaps also an adverse affect
on stock price-a nightmarish combination from the perspective of
management.B
In contrast, a derivative suit may present less of a threat. First, there
are all the obstacles discussed above. There is also the reality that, even
if directors are unsuccessful on a motion to dismiss (for plaintiffs
failure to make demand or otherwise state a cause of action), they still
229. Title 8, section § 141(a) of the Delaware Code provides that "[tihe business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
See also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
230. See DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 242(b) (1991) (providing that the board must first
adopt a resolution and then call for consideration of amendment by the shareholders).
231. See General Datacomn, 731 A.2d at 820.
232. See General Datacom Industries, Inc., Form DEFA14A: Definitive Proxy
Statement (Feb. 5, 1999) <http://www.freeedgar.com>. According to one commentator,
this was the first time "a shareholder initiative on a pay issue won a majority vote." Peg
O'Hara, The Role of Pension Plans in Corporate Governance, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY: PENSION POLICY CONFERENCE ERISA AFTER 25 YEARS, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 11,
64, available in Westlaw, SE 40 ALI-ABA 11.
233. Institutional investors often own significant amounts of a company's stock.
Apart from the voting power this gives them, it also provides them with some financial
leverage. Indeed, if large institutional investors sell their blocks of stock, the company's
stock price will probably suffer, which in turn will subject management to further
criticism and scrutiny.
234. This would be especially troubling to management "whose tenure and salary
depends on stock price performance." Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 613, 681 (1988) (noting that such management will be tempted to "focus
attention on maintaining or increasing stock prices"). See also J. Robert Brown, Jr., In
Defense of Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REv. 57, 74 (1990) ("Afraid that a single
mistake may depress stock prices and act as a catalyst for lurking bidders, management
has considerable incentive to avoid strategies that could result in an attention-grabbing
blunder.").
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have the reserve weapon of a special litigation committee's
recommendation of dismissal.235  If that fails, indemnification, 6
insurance, 37  and exculpation statutese8  offer additional lines of
defense. 9  Considered together, some directors may conclude that
derivative litigation is more of a nuisance than a substantial threat.2 4 On
the other hand, the institutional shareholder, even one not threatening
litigation, is a force to be reckoned with.24'
VI. CONCLUSION
Option repricing presents a scenario that may, at first glance, appear to
be nothing other than another opportunity for shareholders to complain
about executive compensation. From this perspective, option repricing
does not present unique or novel legal issues. The law of fiduciary
obligation and the business judgment rule must each have some room in
the analysis. How much room each should have is a question that
figures prominently in most cases and commentary discussing director
misconduct. This question isolates a tension that inevitably exists in a
corporation between its shareholders and directors.
Option repricing does present, however, something different than
235. See generally Robert K. Payson et al., After Maldonado: The Role of the
Special Litigation Committee in the Investigation and Dismissal of Derivative Suits, 37
Bus. LAw. 1199 (1982). See also, e.g., Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 971 (Del. Ch.
1985) (discussing committee that recommended company move to dismiss derivative
action based upon factors such as expense and disruptive effect on corporate
management).
236. See generally Donald E. Pease, Indemnification Under Section 145 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 167 (1978).
237. See generally Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability
Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAw. 1993 (1978).
238. See, e.g., DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (providing that certificate
of incorporation may contain provision which, apart from certain exceptions including
breaches of the duty of loyalty, eliminates or limits the "personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as
a director").
239. See Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in Corporate Law: Perfecting
the Exoneration of Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and Straining the Framework
of Corporate Law, 1998 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 443, 489-90 (discussing director
protection through exculpation statutes, insurance, and indemnification); E. Norman
Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited
Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAw. 399 (Feb. 1987).
240. But see Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the
American Law Institute, 48 Bus. LAw. 1443, 1483 (1993) (suggesting that derivative
actions may inhibit director innovation and risk taking).
241. See supra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
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other cases of executive compensation, involving salary or bonuses.
Here, a director who is the grantee of stock options is placed, for the
purposes of compensation, in the position of a shareholder. The purpose
in doing this is to provide the director with the incentive to increase
shareholder wealth (i.e., stock price) in which the director will share.
Repricing, whatever its other vices or virtues may be, empowers a
director to extricate herself from the shareholder's dilemma of holding
or selling after a drop in stock price. She can step back into her role as
director and rescue herself from being a shareholder. The lifeboat she
has, however, holds only a select few, and the common shareholder is
not among them.
It may be that the law of derivative litigation and fiduciary obligation
has not adequately maintained the balance of power between
shareholders and directors and that the effect of structural bias has been
underestimated. This may explain the emerging role of the institutional
shareholder.242 In fact, the very appearance of such players, their active
efforts to lobby management on such issues as option repricing, and
their success suggest that the investment of the common shareholder is
not otherwise adequately protected. Only when the power of common
shareholders is aggregated through financial investors is the voice of the
common shareholder heard.
Ultimately, the institutional shareholder may provide a means of
negotiating problems such as option repricing that is more efficient and
effective than derivative litigation. One might say, therefore, "problem
solved." Institutional shareholders are not, however, watchdogs for all
corporations. There are many companies that cannot rely on
institutional investors and must be able to reasonably rely on law and
derivative litigation for protection. Courts, therefore, might also profit
from the lessons institutional investors seek to teach management
regarding option repricing.
None of the foregoing should suggest that, in any given circumstance,
option repricing decisions are not subject to business judgment rule
protection. They may, however, constitute self-dealing or waste. The
law of fiduciary obligation and derivative litigation should strive to
reliably discern the difference. In the context of option repricing, this
242. Even in the settlement context, institutional investors have made their presence
known. As part of a recent settlement of a securities class action, the State of Wisconsin
Investment Board successfully obtained certain corporate governance changes, including
a prohibition of repricing underwater stock options without shareholder approval. See
Keith L. Johnson & Richard H. Koppes, Cellstar and Cal Micro Cases Provide New
Model for Securities Fraud Litigation, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, Oct. 7, 1999, at 537, 542, available in Westlaw, SE39 ALI-
ABA 537.
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requires an understanding of the need for the repricing and of who
benefits from the repricing, as well as the circumstances (including
management's performance) preceding and attending the. repricing.
Only by closely examining these things may a court make a
determination as to whether the traditional deference to managerial
decision-making is appropriate.
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